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SUBSTANTIVE PENAL HATE CRIME
LEGISLATION: TOWARD DEFINING
CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES FOLLOWING
THE R.A.V. v. CITY OF ST. PAUL AND
WISCONSIN v. MITCHELL DECISIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Discriminatory hate crime1 perpetrated against individu-
als based upon their race, religion, national origin, disability,
gender, or sexual orientation is a serious, pervasive, and in-
creasing national problem. 2 Legislators and judges acknowl-
© 1994 Lisa S.L. Ho. The author wishes to thank Professor Margaret Russell,
Angelo Ancheta, and Doreena Wong for their thoughtful comments and helpful
suggestions.
1. This comment distinguishes between "hate crime" and "hate speech."
For the purposes of this comment, "hate crime" or "hate violence" refers to any
act of intimidation, harassment, physical force, or threat of physical force di-
rected against any person, his or her family, or his or her property or advocate,
motivated either in whole or in part by the hostility to the person's real or per-
ceived ethnic background, national origin, religious belief, sex, age, disability,
or sexual orientation, with the intention of causing fear or intimidation. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
"Hate speech," in contrast, means "speech perceived as harmful and offen-
sive to minorities." GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1131 (12th ed.
1991).
2. For a description detailing the serious nature of hate crimes, see Mari J.
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). Professor Matsuda states that the effects of hate
crime on the victim's self-esteem and sense of personal security are devastating.
Id. at 2337-38. Professor Matsuda argues that the victim's feelings that he or
she is alone comes not only from the hate message itself, but also from the gov-
ernment's tolerance. Id. See also Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 133 (1982). Professor Delgado indicates that discriminatory expression in-
jures the dignity and self-regard of the person to whom it is addressed, because
it communicates the message that distinctions of race are distinctions of merit,
dignity, status, and personhood. Id. at 135-36. Professor Delgado states that
not only does the listener learn and internalize the message contained in racial
insults, but that these messages color society's institutions and are transmitted
to succeeding generations. Id. at 136.
For statistical information indicating a rising trend of hate activity, see
generally L.A. COUNTY COMM'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS, HATE CRIME IN Los AN-
GELES COUNTY 1992 (Mar. 1993) (compiling figures of hate violence within Los
Angeles County between 1991-1992). See also L.A. COUNTY COMM'N ON HUMAN
RELATIONS, HATE CRIME IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY 1991 (Mar. 1992) (providing
statistics of hate crime incidents within Los Angeles County from 1990-1991);
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edge the growing hate crime problem, but the two groups
clash on how to respond effectively to the crisis.3 Legislators,
recognizing that hate violence threatens the safety of their
communities, have enacted numerous substantive4 and pro-
cedural' penal6 hate crime laws at the federal, state, and lo-
cal levels to curb and deter the hate activity trend.7
L.A. COUNTY COMM'N ON HuMAN RELATIONS, HATE CRIME IN Los ANGELES
COuNTY 1990 (Feb. 1991) (reporting Los Angeles County hate crime activity
from 1989-1990).
3. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). In R.A.V., the
United States Supreme Court invalidated a St. Paul bias-motivated crime ordi-
nance aimed at shielding symbols of bigotry such as burning crosses and Nazi
swastikas, from racial minorities and other protected groups. For a comprehen-
sive discussion of R.A.V., see infra text accompanying notes 212-66.
4. For purposes of this comment, a substantive penal hate crime law is
distinguished from a procedural penal hate crime provision. The basic differ-
ence between a substantive and a procedural penal hate crime statute is that
the former allows the government to punish the perpetrator for personal injury,
threats, or property damage because of the victim's specified beliefs or charac-
teristics. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL. CODE § 422.6 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (al-
lowing government to punish a perpetrator who interferes with the victim's ex-
ercise of his or her civil rights). A California court of appeal has upheld Penal
Code Section 422.6. In re M.S., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1328 (1993). On November 17,
1993, the California Supreme Court granted a petition for review. At the time
of this comment's publication, the court had not rendered its decision.
5. A procedural hate crime penalty-enhancement provision increases a
convicted individual's punishment if the government demonstrates that the
perpetrator intended to harm the victim based upon his or her specified beliefs
or personal characteristics. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.7 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1992) (allowing a misdemeanor conviction to be raised to a felony). In
California v. Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr.2d 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), a California
Appellate Court upheld California Penal Code § 422.7. On June 24, 1993, the
California Supreme Court denied reveiew of the appellate court decision. See
also CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.75 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (providing that a
felony conviction may be raised to a more serious felony offense level).
6. This comment focuses on the use of penal statutes to combat the hate
crime problem. California, however, affords hate crime victims with certain
civil remedies. The Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976, codified at California Civil
Code §§ 51.7 and 52, provides a civil remedy for individuals subjected to dis-
criminatory conduct. The Act states that California residents have the right to
be free from intimidation and interference with their civil rights based on race,
religion, ancestry, national origin, or sexual orientation. CAL. Crv. CODE
§§ 51.7, 52 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993).
7. The federal criminal civil rights statute providing for punishment for
the perpetrator of a hate crime is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988). Califor-
nia's substantive penal hate crime statute is California Penal Code § 422.6,
which is part of the Bane Civil Rights Act. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West
1988 & Supp. 1993). For a general discussion regarding the enactment of hate
crime legislation in various jurisdictions, see Marion Zenn Golberg, Statutes
Combat Hate Crimes in 46 States, ADL Reports, 28 TRLAL 88 (1992).
An example of a municipal hate crime ordinance is Minnesota Legislative
Code § 292.02, which made it a misdemeanor for an offender to display a sym-
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Legislative attempts to quell hate crimes by enacting
substantive penal hate crime legislation, however, have met
resistance in federal and state courts. Specifically, in R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul,8 five U.S. Supreme Court Justices sent a
strong message. The Court struck down a local bias-moti-
vated crime ordinance that banned cross-burning, holding
that such expression is protected by the First Amendment.
9
The majority in R.A.V. decided that such a content- and view-
point-based regulation of hate expression was facially uncon-
stitutional. 10 Thus, the Court held that despite the govern-
ment's compelling interests in ensuring the basic human
rights of the members of groups historically subjected to dis-
crimination, including the right of such members to live in
peace where they wish," a law that discriminates based upon
a message's content is an unreasonable abridgment of an in-
dividual's First Amendment rights.'
2
In the aftermath of the R.A. V. decision, legislators, crimi-
nal law attorneys, civil rights advocates, and civil libertari-
ans have questioned the holding's effect on existing substan-
tive penal hate crime legislation.' 3 Specifically, legislators at
all levels of government must now carefully examine their
bol causing resentment to the community due to race, religion, or gender.
MiN-. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990). The United States Supreme Court invali-
dated this ordinance in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
8. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
9. Id. at 2550. The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
10. R.A.V. 112 S. Ct. at 2542. The St. Paul ordinance was held invalid on
its face, because it "prohibit[ed] otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis
of the subjects the speech address[ed]." Id.
11. Id. at 2549.
12. Id. at 2550.
13. See, e.g., Stephen G. Hirsch, Justices Strike Down Minnesota Hate-
Crimes Law; High Court Ruling's Effect on California Statutes Unclear, THiE
RECORDER, June 23, 1992, at 1. In the article, ACLU lobbyist Margaret Pena
states, "U]ust don't ask me what the effect is on the California statutes ....
People are basically confused." Id.
See also Don Terry, The Supreme Court: Rights Advocates Uncertain About
Ruling's Impact, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1992, at A16. Loren Siegel of the New
York ACLU said:
It's going to take a lot of litigation in order to sort things out .... Any
of the laws being passed by state legislatures that treat crimes moti-
vated by racial, ethnic, religious[,] or gender bias in a special way are
now vulnerable to constitutional attack because of [the R.A.V.] deci-
sion. That concerns us.
1994]
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current substantive penal hate crime laws and amend them
to conform to the R.A.V. decision.
To further complicate matters, R.A. V. left many guessing
whether procedural penal hate crime legislation would also
be invalidated. 14 Recently, however, the Court clarified some
unanswered questions in the R.A.V. with its holding in Wis-
consin v. Mitchell. 5 In Mitchell, where the Court interpreted
a procedural penal hate crime statute, a unanimous decision
upheld a Wisconsin penalty-enhancement provision, holding
that the statute, which provided for the enhancement of a de-
fendant's sentence when the defendant intentionally selects
his or her victim on the basis of race, does not violate the de-
fendant's First Amendment rights.16
The R.A.V. and Mitchell decisions must be reconciled to
ensure that current and prospective substantive penal hate
crime legislation passes constitutional tests. When reviewing
or drafting their substantive penal hate crime laws, legisla-
tors should recognize that the R.A. V. decision invalidated the
regulation of expressive speech. Pursuant to the R.A.V. and
Mitchell decisions, however, the government is not prohibited
from proscribing violent conduct. In short, lawmakers need to
determine whether their substantive penal hate crime laws
intend to regulate "hate speech"1 7 or violent, destructive con-
14. With regard to the validity of hate crime penalty-enhancement statutes,
the Mitchell decision upheld a Wisconsin penalty-enhancement statute. Wis-
consin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2202 (1993). Prior to the Mitchell decision,
state courts were split over the constitutionality of penalty-enhancement
statutes.
The following court decisions have upheld hate crime penalty-enhancement
statutes: Dobbins v. Florida, 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1992) (upholding Florida pen-
alty-enhancement statute); Kinser v. State, 591 A.2d 894 (Md. 1991) (upholding
Maryland penalty-enhancement statute); People v. Grupe, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815
(N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (upholding a New York State penalty-enhancement stat-
ute); State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992) (Oregon Supreme Court deny-
ing challenge to state's penalty-enhancement statute); and State v. Beebe, 680
P.2d 11 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (Oregon Appellate Court upholding state's penalty-
enhancement statute).
A noteworthy pre-Mitchell state supreme court case, however, struck down
a penalty-enhancement provision in Ohio v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992)
(invalidating an ethnic intimidation statute in punishing motive alone, because
it allegedly intended to create a "thought crime" in violation of state and federal
constitutions). The Wyant ruling was rendered shortly after the R.A.V. deci-
sion. The Mitchell case overruled Wyant.
15. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
16. Id. at 2202.
17. An example of a case challenging a "hate speech" law is Collin v. Smith,
578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). In Smith, the
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duct.18 This comment examines the validity of substantive
penal hate crime laws following the R.A.V. and Mitchell deci-
sions.19 This comment describes and analyzes the First
Amendment and due process concerns of hate crime legisla-
tion that are susceptible to constitutional attack and pro-
poses legislative guidelines to enable the lawmaker to test
ordinance prohibited the dissemination of any materials that intentionally pro-
moted and incited hatred against persons by reason of their race, national ori-
gin, or religion. Id. at 1199. The Smith court struck down the ordinance and
upheld a neo-Nazi group's right to demonstrate in a predominantly Jewish com-
munity. Id. at 1207, 1210. But see National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S.
43 (1977) (reversing the Illinois Supreme Court's denial of a city's stay to enjoin
American Nazis from marching in Skokie, Illinois, a community with a large
Jewish American population).
Within the university setting, a student successfully challenged a "hate
speech code" in Doe v. University. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
In Doe, the regulation stated that individuals were subject to discipline for any
verbal or physical behavior that stigmatized or victimized an individual on the
basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin,
ancestry, age, marital status, handicap, or Vietnam veteran status, in any way
that had the purpose or effect of interfering with an individual's academic ef-
forts, employment, participation in extra-curricular activities, or personal
safety. Id. at 856.
18. For example, California's substantive penal hate crime statute punishes
discriminatory conduct, not speech:
(a) No person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall by force
or threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or
threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right
or privilege secured to him or her by the constitution or laws of this
state or by the Constitution or laws of the United States because of the
other person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability,
gender, or sexual orientation.
(b) No person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall know-
ingly deface, damage, or destroy the real or personal property of any
other person for the purpose of intimidating or interfering with the free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to the other per-
son by the constitution or laws of this state or by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, because of the other person's race, color, reli-
gion, ancestry, national origin, disability, gender, or sexual orientation.
(c) Any person convicted of violating subdivision (a) or (b) shall be pun-
ished by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by a
fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both that im-
prisonment and fine. However, no person shall be convicted of violating
subdivision (a) based upon speech alone, except upon a showing that the
speech itself threatened violence against a specific person or group of
persons and that the defendant had the apparent ability to carry out the
threat.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
19. For a discussion distinguishing substantive penal hate crime legislation
from procedural penalty-enhancement provisions, see supra notes 4-5.
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the constitutionality of current and prospective substantive
penal hate crime legislation.20
Part II provides a general overview of the purposes for
enacting substantive penal hate crime legislation2 1 and also
presents some First Amendment and due process issues po-
tentially affecting the validity of such laws.22 Part II also
surveys previous judicial treatment of hate-crime-related is-
sues, such as expression and conduct, and distinguishes the
differences in judicial scrutiny provided to each.2" In addi-
tion, Part II introduces the regulation of "expressive conduct"
and describes the guidelines set forth in United States v.
O'Brien.24
Part III discusses the need for legislative reprensenta-
tives to grasp the consequences and implications of the R.A. V.
and Mitchell decisions.25 This section suggests that
lawmakers must also consider potentially fatal flaws in sub-
stantive penal hate crime provisions, such as overbreadth
and vagueness, which were not addressed in the R.A.V.
case.
26
Part IV presents the facts of the R.A.V. case and analyzes
the holding set forth in the majority opinion, which states
that content-based regulations are presumptively invalid and
must satisfy strict-scrutiny judicial review. 21 Part IV also de-
scribes the enumerated exceptions in the R.A.V. decision that
exempt neutral and conduct-based regulations from invalida-
tion.29 This section also addresses issues that fell outside the
R.A.V. majority discussion, but that are nevertheless rele-
vant when considering the constitutionality of substantive
penal hate crime legislation. 0 These concerns include review
under the expressive conduct guidelines enumerated in
20. For proposed legislative guidelines for substantive penal hate crime leg-
islation, see infra text accompanying notes 343- 351.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 36-75.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 76-110.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 111-206.
24. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See infra text accompanying notes 153-179 for a
discussion of the facts and guidelines established in O'Brien.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 207-211.
26. See infra text accompanying note 210.
27. For a discussion of the concurring opinions in R.A. V., see infra note 245.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 212-245.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 246-267.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 266-304.
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United States v. O'Brien3 1 and due process requirements re-
garding vague or overbroad laws. 32 Part IV also discusses
the Wisconsin v. Mitchell case, laying out the facts, explain-
ing how the Justices reached their nine-to-zero decision, 3
and concluding with the decision's implications for current
and prospective substantive penal hate crime legislation.
4
Part V proposes guidelines to determine whether sub-
stantive penal hate crime laws satisfy both First Amendment
and due process mandates. 35 These guidelines propose that
carefully drafted legislation may substantively proscribe hate
violence if the regulation lays out specific language that regu-
lates certain bias-motivated conduct.
II. A BACKGROUND OF THE ISSUES THAT IMPACT
SUBSTANTIVE PENAL HATE CRIME LEGISLATION:
THE HATE CRIME PROBLEM VERSUS THE
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS
A. The Hate Crime Problem: An Overview
Legislators recently recognized the serious nature and
rise in discriminatory violence and enacted legislative meas-
ures to address the increasing trend.s6 The following section
introduces the particularly troublesome nature of hate crimes
and describes the accompanying substantive penal hate
crime legislation aimed at remedying the problem.
1. The Serious Nature of Bias-Motivated Violence
Crimes motivated by bigotry and intolerance are serious
problems because discriminatory violence results in severe
physical and psychological harm to the victim.
3 7 Scientific
studies indicate that hate crimes are far more violent and le-
thal than other attacks; victims of hate crimes are four times
31. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See infra text accompanying notes 275-295 for an
analysis of substantive penal hate crime legislation under the O'Brien
guidelines.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 296-304.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 305-339.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 340-342.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 343-351.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 37-75.
37. See Daniel Goleman, As Bias Crime Seems to Rise, Scientists Study
Roots of Racism, N.Y. TIMEs, May 29, 1990, at C1.
19941
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more likely to require hospitalization than victims of other
assaults.38
Discriminatory violence also impacts the community
where the victim is a member s.3  Discriminatory confronta-
tions are generally more serious than non-discriminatory
crimes, because they often escalate from individual conflicts
to mass disturbances, resulting in more serious potential con-
sequences than those associated with other assault cases.40
A recent and serious example of this "backlash effect" oc-
curred following the beating of African-American motorist
Rodney G. King by a group of police officers, none of whom
were of African-American descent.41 A jury, lacking any
members of African-American descent, acquitted the officers,
which resulted in the Los Angeles civil uprising in the spring
of 1992.42 Recent Southern California statistics confirm the
link between racially motivated incidents and massive vio-
lence. The report indicates that "incidents motivated by race
increased significantly after the civil unrest in [April and
May of 1992] and have not yet decreased to pre-civil unrest
levels."43
Courts have started to recognize the serious harms posed
by hate violence. For example, in State v. Plowman,4 4 the Or-
egon Supreme Court upheld the state's bias-motivated hate
crime statute, agreeing with the Oregon legislature's deter-
mination that when a victim is harmed on the basis of group
membership, a societal harm different and greater than the
38. See id.
39. For a description of the seriousness of hate crimes, see Matsuda, supra
note 2, at 2337-38. See also Delgado, supra note 2, at 135-36.
40. See, e.g., State v. Beebe, 680 P.2d 11 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
41. See Richard A. Serrano & Tracy Wilkinson, All 4 in King Beating Ac-
quitted, Violence Follows; Guard Called Out, L.A. TIMES, April 30, 1992, at Al.
"Four Los Angeles police officers won acquittals [on April 29, 1992] in their trial
for the beating of black motorist Rodney G. King, igniting renewed outrage over
a racially charged case that had triggered a national debate on police brutality."
Id.
See also Marc Lacey & Shawn Hubler, Rioters Set Fires, Loot Stores; 4 Re-
ported Dead, L.A. TIMES, April 30, 1992, at Al. "Rioting mobs ignited fires, beat
motorists, and looted stores and offices throughout Los Angeles as fears of race-
related violence came to pass after the acquittal of four Los Angeles police of-
ficers in the beating of Rodney G. King." Id.
42. See supra note 41.
43. Martha Nakagawa, Hate Crime Statistics, ASIAN WEEK, March 19,
1993, at 12 (citing YEAR END 1992 ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS MOTIVATED BY HA-
TRED/PREJUDICE, L.A. CouNTY COMM'N ON HuMAN RELATIONS (1993)).
44. 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992).
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harm caused by a non-bias-motivated assault is created.4 5
The Oregon Supreme Court stated that because hate crimes
are directed not only toward the victim, but essentially to-
ward an entire group, bias-motivated conduct invites retalia-
tion and causes insecurity in group members.46
The Plowman court also noted that hate crimes are par-
ticularly harmful because the victim is attacked on the basis
of his or her perceived characteristics, underscoring the his-
tory of unequal treatment toward certain groups in American
society.4 7 The court concluded that violent and invidious
harms caused by hate crimes are harms the legislature is en-
titled to proscribe and penalize with the use of criminal
laws.48 Thus, because the impact resulting from hate crimes
is both severe and pervasive, any increase in hate crime ac-
tivity is of significant concern to the legislature.
2. The Rise in Discriminatory Hate Activity
The number of annual hate crime incidents continues to
rise. Statistics in Los Angeles County, for example, indicate
that from 1989 to 1990, the total number of hate crimes in-
creased by 146%; of this total, racially based hate crimes in-
creased by 65%, and crimes committed against lesbian and
gay individuals increased 45%.49 From 1990 to 1991, the to-
tal number of overall hate crimes in Los Angeles County in-
creased 22%.50 This number includes an increase of 27% in
the total number of racially discriminatory hate crimes and
an increase of 36% for victims chosen because of their sexual
orientation.5 1 Between 1991 and 1992, hate crimes increased
11% and racial hate crimes increased 23.6%, setting a new
record for such crimes.
52
While these figures indicate an increasing trend of hate
violence, they may underestimate the actual number of inci-
dents because many acts of hate violence remain unre-
45. Id. at 563-64.
46. Id. at 564.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. L.A. COUNTY COMM'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS, HATE CRIME IN Los ANGE-
LES COUNTY 1990, at 1, 5 (Feb. 1991).
50. L.A. COUNTY COMM'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS, HATE CRIME IN Los ANGE-
LES COUNTY 1991, at 1 (Mar. 1992).
51. Id.
52. L.A. COUNTY COMM'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS, HATE CRIME IN Los ANGE-
LES COUNTY 1992, at 1 (Mar. 1993).
1994]
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ported.53 An additional problem with obtaining accurate ac-
counts is that police officers at the crime scene often fail to
recognize certain incidents as hate crimes. 4 For these rea-
sons, Congress and state legislatures undertook affirmative
steps to remedy the growing hate crime problem.
3. United States Congressional and California
Legislative Responses to the Hate Crime
Problem
Legislative action to control hate crimes has taken two
forms. First, legislators began to monitor and retain statis-
tics of hate crimes to get a clearer picture of their pervasive
nature.55 Second, lawmakers enacted various substantive
penal hate crime statutes." This subsection describes the
legislative actions taken to address the hate crime problem.
Congress and most state legislatures enacted statutes to
monitor the growing problem of discriminatory violence and
to obtain precise figures for the incidence and rate of hate
crime activity.57 At the federal level, Congress enacted the
Hate Crimes Statistics Act5" to monitor hate crimes.5 9 In
California, the state legislature also passed a Hate Crime
Statistics Act.6 0 The purpose of the California Hate Crime
53. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS IssuEs FACING ASIAN
AMERICANS IN THE 1990's, at 48 (1992) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT] (find-
ing that victims of all races are unlikely to report racial incidents and are often
reluctant to identify them as racial incidents).
54. Id. For example, of 452 hate incidents included in a Boston report, only
19 were subsequently identified as hate crimes by police officers on the scene.
Id.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 57-61.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 62-75.
57. See CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 53, at 45-47. In addition, a
number of U.S. cities collect statistics on hate crimes. These cities include Phil-
adelphia, Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, and New York City. Id.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
59. For the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), the
Hate Crimes Statistics Act, see Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990). The
Hate Crimes Statistics Act directs the Attorney General to collect data on "the
incidence of criminal acts that manifest prejudice based on race, religion, homo-
sexuality or heterosexuality, ethnicity, or such other characteristics as the At-
torney General considers appropriate" for a four-year period and to analyze and
publish the data. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). See also CIVIL RIGHTS
REPORT, supra note 53, at 45-47.
60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13023 (West 1992).
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Statistics Act is to provide information to law enforcement of-
ficials for response to and prevention of hate crimes. 6 '
In addition, federal and state governments have enacted
substantive penal hate crime legislation as tools to alleviate
the nationwide hate crime problem.62 These statutes typi-
cally punish a perpetrator who, motivated by bias, physically
injures or damages the property of another person.6 3 The
penalties provided by such statutes include fines, imprison-
ment, or both.64  The following section overviews federal and
state substantive penal hate crime statutes and their legisla-
tive purposes.
a. 18 U.S.C. Section 242
The federal criminal civil rights statute65 protects in-
habitants of any state, territory or district of the United
States from discriminatory acts conducted by a perpetrator
61. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON RACIAL, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND
MINORITY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT, at 19-20 (Apr. 1990) [hereinafter ATTORNEY
GENERAL].
62. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, HATE CRIMES STATUTES:
A 1991 STATUS REPORT, at 1-2, 22. See also NATIONAL INSTITUTE AGAINST PREJ-
UDICE & VIOLENCE, STRIKING BACK AT BIGOTRY: REMEDIES UNDER FEDERAL AND
STATE LAWS FOR VIOLENCE MOTIVATED BY RACIAL, RELIGIOUS, AND ETHNIC PREJ-
UDICE, at 61-65 (1986 & Supp. 1988).
For a discussion of the distinction between substantive and procedural pe-
nal hate crime legislation, see supra notes 4-5.
63. For examples of statutory verbiage identifying personal injury and
property damage as civil rights violations, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6(a)(b)
(West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988). This statute provides for fines and/or im-
prisonment for anyone who deprives any person of his or her civil rights. Id. If
bodily injury results, the term of imprisonment may be as high as ten years. Id.
If death results, the perpetrator may be subject to imprisonment for any term of
years or for life. Id.
The California statute, Penal Code § 422.6, authorizes a maximum fine of
$5,000 and/or incarceration in a county jail for one year. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 422.6 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
65. 65. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988). This section provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or cus-
tom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or Dis-
trict to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to dif-
ferent punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person be-
ing an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for
the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or im-
prisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death results shall be
subject to imprisonment for any term of years of for life.
Id. (emphasis added).
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who acted under the color of any law, statute, ordinance, reg-
ulation, or custom.66
Congressional intent when drafting the federal criminal
civil rights law was similar to previous civil anti-discrimina-
tion laws: the purpose of each was to remedy and deter invidi-
ous conduct against racial minorities and other protected
groups.67 This connection between 18 U.S.C. Section 242, the
federal criminal civil rights statute, and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 is illustrated in Screws v. United States.68 In Screws,
the United States Supreme Court noted that the federal anti-
discriminatory criminal laws stem from the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, which intended to protect the civil rights of all per-
sons in the United States and to furnish a means of vindica-
tion for their deprivation. 69 The Court in Screws indicated
that the purpose of the Civil Rights Act was to cure racial
discrimination against African-Americans at the end of the
Civil War.7 °
66. Id. In other words, this criminal statute requires state action. Under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), however, an individual may bring a civil action against
private individuals based upon civil conspiracy. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988 &
Supp. 1993).
67. For the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988) (the federal criminal
civil rights statute), see Pub. L. No. 90-294, 75 Stat. 1837 (1968).
68. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
69. Id. at 98-99.
70. Id. Substantively, the federal criminal civil rights statute is similar to
the legislative purposes in federal anti-discrimination civil rights laws. The in-
tended purpose of these laws is to protect individuals from discrimination. Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, prohibits discrimination in em-
ployment based on the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988). Title VII bars employers from engaging in discrimi-
natory practices with regard to hiring, discharging, earning and promoting, and
harassing employees. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) (recognizing that all
persons have full and equal benefit of laws enjoyed by white citizens); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1988) (providing that all citizens have the same rights as white citizens
to have and hold real and personal property); 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988) (setting
forth a national policy to provide for fair housing); and 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1988)
(providing individuals private remedies for violations under the Fair Housing
Act).
When addressing the problem of gender discrimination, the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged that women are often targeted for discrimination
and need redress measures. In Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), a
national young men's organization denied women regular membership. Id.
The organization was charged with violating the Minnesota Human Rights Act,
which makes it "an unfair discriminatory practice ... [t]o deny any person the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race,
color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex." Id. at 614-15. The club
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At the state level, California recently enacted substan-
tive penal hate crime legislation. The following section dis-
cusses California's substantive penal hate crime statute.
b. California Penal Code Section 422.6
Like Congress, the California Legislature recognized the
need to make discriminatory hate violence a criminal of-
fense. 71 By 1987, the Legislature acknowledged the inade-
quacy of existing law and the increase in crimes committed
due to group status.72 The Legislature also recognized that
existing civil statutes did little to deter hate violence, as no
criminal penalties were present.73 It noted that existing
criminal statutes, such as trespass and vandalism, did not re-
flect the seriousness of racially motivated violence.74 As a re-
members argued that the Act abridged their rights to expression and protected
speech. Id. The Court upheld the Act and explained its underlying reason:
Discrimination... cause[s] unique evils that government has a com-
pelling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the point of view such
conduct may transmit. Accordingly, like violence or other types of po-
tentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from
their communicative impact, such practices are entitled to no constitu-
tional protection.
Id. at 628.
71. California has many civil rights statutes that deal with discriminatory
threats of violence. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 52.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993)
(the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976 allows civil action for violation of an individ-
ual's civil rights); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 subd. (a)(16) (West 1988 & Supp.
1993) (designating homicide based on the victim's race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin as a special circumstance in first-degree murder charges); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 302 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (authorizing punishment to per-
sons who willfully disturb a religious worship meeting); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 594.3 subd. (b) (West 1988) (providing punishment for one who knowingly
vandalizes a place of worship because of racial or religious prejudice); CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 1170.75 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993) (harming a person because of his
or her race, color, religion, national origin, disability, or gender is an aggravat-
ing circumstance for criminal sentencing purposes); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.8
(West 1985) (intentionally vandalizing a place of worship is an aggravating cir-
cumstance); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.85 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993) (knowingly
victimizing aged or disabled persons is an aggravating circumstance).
72. SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY REPORT, As Amended June 26, 1987,
at 3 (1987).
73. Id.
74. Id. Several years earlier, the California Attorney General compiled a
commission to survey racial, ethnic, religious, and minority violence within the
state. Among the findings contained in its report, the Commission stated:
Hate violence persists in California and poses a threat to the peace and
safety of our communities .... Enactment of a comprehensive civil
rights statute with criminal penalties and amendments is necessary to
effectively deter hate violence. Existing civil and criminal laws fail to
effectively protect the rights of hate violence victims.
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sult, the California Legislature passed Penal Code Section
422.6, a substantive penal hate crime law.15
In sum, legislators recognized the serious nature of hate
violence and noted that such incidents are increasing. For
these reasons, federal and state legislators addressed the
problem by passing laws to remedy the hate crime problem.
B. Individual Freedoms: An Overview
Substantive penal hate crime legislation affects individ-
ual expressive freedoms, thereby implicating the First
Amendment.7 6 Specifically, hate crime legislation affects an
individual's First Amendment right to think and believe what
he or she chooses.7 7 This subsection examines First Amend-
ment and due process issues raised by substantive penal hate
crime legislation.
1. First Amendment Concerns: Expressive Freedoms
The First Amendment provides that, "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech."7 8 Justices
Brandeis and Holmes were the first Supreme Court Justices
to fully embrace the freedom-of-expression principles es-
poused in the First Amendment. Justice Brandeis said that
the First Amendment provides individuals the "freedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think."7 9  Justice
Holmes felt that one underlying purpose of the First Amend-
ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 61, at 7.
75. California Penal Code § 422.6, the substantive penal hate crime provi-
sion of the Bane Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIv. CODE § 52.1 (West 1993), provides
that it is a misdemeanor to commit an act of violence against an individual
based on the individual's race, religion, ancestry, national origin, or sexual ori-
entation. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). For the lan-
guage of CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 422.6, see supra note 18.
The legislative purpose behind penalty-enhancement statutes is similar to
the reasons for enacting substantive penal hate crime legislation. In People v.
Lashley, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), the court acknowledged the
lack of protection available to hate violence victims without tough laws and in-
dicated that the California statutes were modeled after anti-discrimination
statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 634-35. For a
discussion of the legislative purposes behind enactment of substantive penal
hate crime legislation, see supra text accompanying notes 36-54.
76. For a discussion of First Amendment principles, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 78-91.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 78-91.
78. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.




ment is to ensure the viability of a "marketplace of ideas."80
Justice Holmes first discussed the "marketplace of ideas" the-
ory in the now-famous dissenting opinion in Abrams v.
United States: 1
The ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the
theory of our Constitution.
8 2
The "marketplace of ideas" approach is still employed by the
Court currently to avoid driving ideas out of the public
forum.8
3
To preserve ideals behind the "marketplace of ideas" the-
ory, "hate speech" and other forms of expression considered
offensive to the intended audience have been protected from
governmental regulation. The R.A.V. case, for example, is
the chief illustration of a fatal attempt at regulating "hate
speech."8 4 Another attempt to regulate "hate speech" was
struck down in Collin v. Smith.85 In Collin, a federal appel-
late court invalidated an ordinance banning "dissemination
of any material . . . which promote[d] and incite[d] hatred
against persons by reason of their race, national origin, or
religion, and [was] intended to do so.""6
Similarly, a number of universities enacted "hate speech"
codes to regulate expression, but these codes were invali-
dated as unconstitutionally infringing on the speaker's First
Amendment rights. In Doe v. University of Michigan, 7 for
example, a federal court in Michigan invalidated the Univer-
80. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
83. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Vic-
tims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 508 (1991) (finding "Son of Sam" law requiring an
accused or convicted criminal's income derived from books or other works
describing the crime be deposited in an escrow account to pay the criminal's
victims and creditors violates the First Amendment).
84. In R.AV., the Court struck down the municipal bias-crime ordinance,
because it punished expression that one knows or has reason to know would
cause anger or resentment on the basis of race, religion, or gender. R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2541 (1992).
85. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
86. Id. at 1199.
87. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
19941
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sity of Michigan's "hate speech" code due to vagueness and
overbreadth problems.8 8  Similarly, in UWM Post, Inc. v.
Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin,8 9 a Wisconsin
court struck down a University of Wisconsin "hate speech"
code. 90
The government, however, may be able to regulate ex-
pression if it can satisfy strict-scrutiny judicial review; in
other words, the government must demonstrate that its nar-
rowly tailored regulation is a necessary means of furthering a
compelling state interest.91
2. Due Process Concerns: Vagueness and Overbreadth
Due process concerns arise when enacting substantive
penal hate crime laws because to be constitutional, criminal
legislation must clearly set forth narrowly defined behavior.92
This section describes vagueness and overbreadth principles.
The problem of vague legislation is that it fails to provide
adequate notice and warning to those affected. 93 Within the
hate crime context, vague statutes risk "chilling" protected
speech.94 In Doe v. University of Michigan,95 for example, the
plaintiff successfully challenged a campus "hate speech" code
as unconstitutionally vague.96
88. Id. at 867. "Vagueness" and 'overbreadth" are terms of art, because
they have specific constitutional meanings. For a definition of vagueness, see
infra text accompanying notes 93- 103. For an explanation of overbreadth, see
infra text accompanying notes 104-108.
89. 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
90. Id. at 1170.
91. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549 (1992). For a com-
prehensive discussion of the elements needed to satisfy strict-scrutiny judicial
review, see infra text accompanying notes 146-152.
92. See JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 950
(4th ed. 1991). For an example of an ordinance successfully challenged on
vagueness and overbreadth grounds, see Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 137-140.
93. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (ordinance that
prohibited only actual or imminent and willful interference with school activity
is constitutional over vagueness arguments).
94. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 1202.
95. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
96. Id. at 867 (the policy that the University of Michigan adopted prohib-
ited individuals from "stigmatizing or victimizing" individuals or groups on the
basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin,
ancestry, age marital status, handicap, or Vietnam veteran status).
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If a law is adequately worded to provide fair warning,
however, it may withstand a vagueness challenge. 97 In addi-
tion, a law is not void for vagueness if a reasonable and prac-
tical construction can be given to the language, or if its terms
are reasonably certain by reference to other definable
sources.98 Another way to cure vagueness problems is to in-
clude a specific intent element in the statute.99 Several fed-
eral and state hate crime laws have been upheld because spe-
cific intent was required as an element of the offense. For
example, in People v. Lashley,100 a California appellate court
upheld a hate crime statute that contained a specific intent
element. 10 1 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Stephens,' 2 a
Massachusetts appellate court held that a hate crime provi-
sion was not unconstitutionally vague because the statute re-
quired specific intent.1
0 3
The doctrine of overbreadth asserts that regulations that
threaten protected expression or conduct are unconstitu-
tional. 10 4 Like First Amendment challenges, overbreadth
challenges commonly invalidate laws that punish "hate
speech." 0 5 In Doe v. University of Michigan,10 6 a federal
court in Michigan invalidated the campus "hate speech code"
97. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). In Grayned, the
defendant was charged with violating an anti-noise ordinance that prohibited
persons near school buildings from willfully disturbing classes. Id. The Court
held that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague since, with fair warn-
ing, it prohibited only actual or imminent and willful interference with normal
school activity, and was not a broad invitation to discriminatory enforcement.
Id. at 112. The defendant's second challenge of overbreadth was also rejected
because expressive activity was prohibited only if it "materially disrupt[ed]"
class work. Id. at 118. For a further discussion of overbreadth principles, see
infra text accompanying notes 104-108.
98. See ACLU v. Board of Educ., 379 P.2d 4 (1963) (holding, inter alia, that
an educational board rule requiring parties interested in using school premises
to file a statement that the property would not be used for criminal syndicalism
was not unconstitutionally vague).
99. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). In Screws, the Court
upheld a federal criminal civil rights statute by rejecting a vagueness challenge
and interpreting the statute to contain a specific intent requirement. Id. at
104. The Court stated that the statute's specific intent element is the purpose
or knowledge to deprive a person of a specific right protected under the express
terms of the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal case law. Id.
100. 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
101. Id. at 630.
102. 515 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987).
103. Id. at 610.
104. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 1191.
105. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
106. Id.
1994]
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because of overbreadth and vagueness.1 °7 The courts, how-
ever, may uphold a rule that specifically prohibits certain
conduct. 1 0 8
In sum, the courts' current trend, apparent in recent
"hate speech" decisions, is to scrutinize legislation that im-
permissibly infringes on an individual's First Amendment
freedoms and due process rights. Therefore, substantive pe-
nal hate crime legislation must be scrutinized on two levels,
because regulating bias-motivated behavior implicates
thorny First Amendment and due process concerns. First,
poorly drafted substantive penal hate crime legislation un-
reasonably restrains the First Amendment's right to express
one's beliefs. 10 9 Second, imprecisely worded substantive pe-
nal hate crime statutes violate an individual's due process
guarantees as they chill one's ability to exercise his or her
First Amendment rights. 110
C. The "Speech" Versus "Conduct" Problem
In R.A.V.,11' the Court based its decision to invalidate
the St. Paul hate speech ordinance on First Amendment prin-
107. Id. at 866.
108. A non-hate-crime example of the Court's treatment is Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). In Broadrick, state employees were charged
with actively engaging in partisan political activities in violation of a state
merit system provision. Id. at 602. The employees challenged two paragraphs
of the Act on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. Id. at 603-04. The first par-
agraph at issue stated that no classified employee "shall directly or indirectly,
solicit, receive, or in any manner be concerned in soliciting or receiving any
assessment ... or contribution for any political organization, candidacy or other
political purpose." Id. at 603-04 n.1. The second paragraph indicated that no
such employee shall belong to "any national, state or local committee of a polit-
ical party" or be an officer or member of a committee or a partisan political club,
or a candidate for any paid public office, or take part in the management or
affairs of any political party or campaign, "except to exercise his right as a citi-
zen privately to express his opinion and ... vote." Id.
The Court upheld both provisions, reasoning that the provisions were not
substantially overbroad because the employees' conduct violated the provisions
of the Act. Id. at 610. The Court also said that these employees did not have
standing to assert that the provisions might be unconstitutionally overbroad to
future employees. Id.
109. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2550 (1992)
(striking down St. Paul ordinance that singled out certain biases).
110. For discussions of Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D.
Mich. 1989), see supra text accompanying notes 87-88, 95-96. In Doe, a federal
court struck down a hate speech code on vagueness and overbreadth grounds.
Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 867.
111. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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ciples prohibiting content-based regulations. 112 Whether a
court views discriminatory expression as "speech" or "expres-
sive conduct" is a critical issue, because the United States
Supreme Court treats pure expression and expressive con-
duct quite differently. 11 3 As a general principle, pure expres-
sion is more protected than expressive conduct. 14 The fol-
lowing subsections summarize and distinguish the United
States Supreme Court's view of these two areas.
1. Treatment of Speech: Content-Based Regulations
Are Presumptively Invalid
Purely expressive messages, especially political speech,
are protected under the First Amendment.1 1 5  The following
discussion explains why government attempts at regulation
of the content of expressive messages are generally struck
down as unconstitutional.
1 6
Past United States Supreme Court jurisprudence pro-
tected expression from content-based regulation." 7  The
112. Id. at 2542.
113. See GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 1286.
114. See id.
115. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that
the press is not liable in a defamation action absent a clear and convincing
showing of actual malice). This holding reflects the core First Amendment pro-
tection granted to pure political speech.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 117-152.
117. See generally GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 999 (describing various U.S.
Supreme Court Justices' defenses of free speech). A state, however, may regu-
late speech if the law does not target the message's content. Id. In Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Citizen's Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) the
Court concluded that expression occurring at a non-public forum may be regu-
lated with content-neutral "time, place, and manner" restrictions if the govern-
ment meets the following three-part test: (1) the regulation is content-neutral;
(2) the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a "significant governmental in-
terest"; and (3) the regulation "leave[s] open alternative channels for communi-
cation of the information." Id. at 771.
The definition of "narrowly tailored" was described in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). In Ward, New York City officials imposed a re-
quirement that rock performers use only city-provided sound equipment and
sound technicians. Id. The Court upheld the requirement as a valid "time,
place, and manner" restriction. Id. at 803. The Court rejected the performers'
least-restrictive-means argument in favor of a means test that is not "substan-
tially broader than necessary" to reduce noise, thus meeting the "narrowly tai-
lored" means test. Id. at 798-802.
A "secondary effects" approach focuses on the indirect, harmful effects
caused by the expression, thereby avoiding content-based scrutiny. In Virginia
Pharmacy Board, the United States Supreme Court held that a regulation is
constitutional if it seeks to minimize the secondary effects of the speech, and
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Court embraced the general principle that where content-
based regulations are imposed on expression, the regulation
is presumptively unconstitutional 1 8 and must surive strict-
scrutiny judicial review."19
It is important, however, to note that the United States
Supreme Court never stated outright that content-based reg-
ulations are always presumptively unconstitutional until the
R.A.V. decision. 120 Over the fifty years preceding R.A.V.,
Supreme Court jurisprudence carved out three unprotected
categories: fighting words, 12 1 obscenity, 122 and defama-
the regulation is justified without reference to the message's content. Virginia
Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 771. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475
U.S. 41 (1986), the Court upheld an ordinance that prohibited the location of
adult theatres "within one thousand feet of any residential zone, single or mul-
tiple-family dwelling, church or school." Id. at 43. In Renton, the Court found
the secondary effects of adult theatres to be "a degradation of the community
standard of morality," which the Court felt was an important secondary effect
to control. Id. at 50.
118. For "hate speech" case examples, see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.
Ct. 2538 (1992) (striking down a St. Paul bias-motivated crime ordinance); Col-
lin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916
(1978) (invalidating an ordinance that banned "dissemination of any material[ ]
... which promote[d] and incite[d] hatred against persons by reason of their
race, national origin, or religion, and is intended to do so").
For an example outside the context of hate speech, see Metromedia, Inc. v.
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). In Metromedia, the Court struck down a San
Diego ordinance that prohibited all billboards containing non-commercial
messages, except for those messages falling within certain defined categories.
Id. The Court stated that "[tihe city may not choose the appropriate subjects
for public discourse." Id. at 515.
119. In strict-scrutiny judicial review, the government needs to show two ele-
ments: (1) "[T]hat its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state inter-
est;" and (2) "that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
120. For a further discussion on the Court's treatment of this issue, see infra
text accompanying notes 224-232.
121. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the United
States Supreme Court determined "fighting words" were an unprotected cate-
gory of speech. Id. at 572. The Court defined fighting words as "those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace." Id.
122. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the United States
Supreme Court held that "obscenity is not within the areas of constitutionally
protected speech or press." Id. at 485. The Court distinguished obscenity from
the portrayal of sex in art, literature, and scientific works. Id. at 487. The
Court defined "obscenity" as "whether to the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to the prurient interest." Id. at 489. The Court defined "prurient"
as "material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts." Id. at 487 n.20. The
Court nevertheless provided First Amendment protection to "all ideas having
even the slightest redeeming social importance." Id. at 484.
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tion. 123 The Court denied First Amendment protection to
"fighting words," for example, because their expressive con-
tent contains "such slight social value as to justify regulating
[their] content. " 124 In cases where the expression is deemed
to be fighting words, obscenity, or defamation, a court per-
forms "rationality review. " 125  The next subsection describes
Sixteen years later, in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the United
States Supreme Court announced a new definition of "obscenity," overruling its
holding in Roth. Id. In Miller, the Court developed the following three-prong
test to determine whether expression should be considered "obscene." First,
whether the "average person, applying contemporary community standards
[would find that] the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest."
Id. at 24. Second, whether the work "depict[ed] or describe[ed], in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law."
Id. Third, whether the work, taken as a whole, lacked "serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value." Id.
123. Defamation remains a category of expression that falls within the con-
tent-based exceptions of presumptive First Amendment protection. The central
state interest in a defamation action is the protection of the plaintiff's reputa-
tion. In Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), a "group libel" case, the
United States Supreme Court sustained an Illinois criminal libel law prohibit-
ing the publishing, selling, or exhibiting in public any publication that "por-
trays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of
any race, color, creed[,I or religion, [or which] exposes the citizens of any race,
color, creed[,] or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is produc-
tive of breach of the peace or riots." Id. at 251. Although not explicitly over-
ruled, the broad holding in Beauharnais is most likely limited by the expansive
First Amendment protection provided in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). In Sullivan, the Court held that media defendants are protected in
news coverage of public officials absent a showing of "actual malice." Id. at 279-
80.
Defamation cases since the Sullivan decision, however, appear to have ex-
panded a plaintiff's civil recovery rights. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974), the United States Supreme Court held that a private person
may recover damages without meeting the Sullivan "actual malice" standard.
Id. Further, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749
(1985), the Court held that defamation involving a private plaintiff suing a non-
media defendant for publishing information on an issue of private concern is
not held to the Sullivan standard. Id. The majority stated that "not all speech
is of equal First Amendment importance." Id. at 758. In addition, the Court
distinguished between fully protected speech and lower-level speech, the deter-
mining factor being whether the expression focused on issues of public concern
or purely private matters. Id. at 758-59.
124. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. In addition to "fighting words," a legisla-
ture may also regulate commercial advertising. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992) (regulating airline advertising held con-
stitutional); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (finding state
bar monitoring lawyer solicitation is constitutionally valid).
125. In judicial scrutiny based on rationality review, the Court inquires
whether (1) the state has a legitimate state interest and (2) whether the law is
rationally related to that legitimate state interest. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at
608-09.
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the Court's treatment of the "fighting words" doctrine and ex-
plains why it is an unprotected category.' 2 6
a. The "Fighting Words" Exception
In R.A. V.,127 the Minnesota Supreme Court construed
the St. Paul bias-motivated crime ordinance to prohibit those
expressions that constitute "fighting words" within the mean-
ing of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.128 The United States
Supreme Court accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's con-
struction because it must defer to a state's interpretation of
its own statute. 129 The United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, concluded that the ordinance prohibited protected ex-
pression of undesirable ideas, and was, therefore, facially
unconstitutional. 130
In Chaplinsky, the United States Supreme Court deter-
mined that "fighting words" fell outside First Amendment
protection because such expression constitutes "utterances
that are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefits
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality."' 31 The United States
Supreme Court also stated that the First Amendment pro-
tects the right to advocate action in furtherance of one's
thoughts, so long as the advocacy is not directed to and likely
to incite imminent acts of lawlessness. 132
The limitation of an individual's expressive rights under
the "fighting words" doctrine manifests the Court's concern
that ideas contained in such expression may lead to an immi-
nent breach of the peace. 133 For example, in Cantwell v. Con-
necticut,13 4 the Court stated:
126. See infra text accompanying notes 127-145.
127. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991).
128. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
129. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992).
130. Id. An earlier hate speech case that has been overruled by the R.AV.
decision is Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the K.K.K., 543 F. Supp.
198, 208 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that "the threat of violence which defendants
communicated through their military activities is precisely such an irrefutable
and dangerous 'communication' that it resembles the use of 'fighting words'. ").
131. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The Court in
Chaplinsky defined fighting words as "those which by their very utterance in-
flict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id.
132. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
133. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
134. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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There are limits to the exercise of [First Amendment] lib-
erties. The danger in these times from the coercive activi-
ties of those who in the delusion of racial or religious con-
ceit would incite violence and breaches of the peace in
order to deprive others of their equal right to the exercise
of their liberties, is emphasized by events familiar to all.
These and other transgressions of those limits the States
appropriately may punish.
13 5
Decisions since Chaplinsky and Cantwell, however, re-
flect the Court's desire to limit the broad implications of the
"fighting words" doctrine and to recognize the potential social
value in statements that might come under the definition of
"fighting words."136 For example, in Terminiello v. Chi-
cago,1 37 the Supreme Court overturned a municipal ordi-
nance that prohibited conduct that "stirs the public to anger,
invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest or creates a
disturbance."138 The Court stated:
A function of free speech under our system of Government
is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high pur-
pose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissat-
isfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people
to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It
may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of
an idea. 13 9
The strong language of Terminiello indicates that the
Court narrowed the broad Chaplinsky "fighting words" stan-
dard by recognizing that a certain amount of provocative and
challenging speech is protected. 40
In more recent cases, the Court further limited Chaplin-
sky by conducting a more critical examination of the audi-
ence, the results of the speech, and the wording of the stat-
ute.' 4 1 For example, in Cohen v. California,4 2 the Court
overturned the defendant's conviction for breach of the peace,
stating that while some unwilling audience members may
have been briefly exposed to the expressive opinion "Fuck the
135. Id. at 310.
136. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 92, at 1059.
137. 337 U.S. 1 (1949), reh'g denied, 337 U.S. 934 (1949).
138. Id. at 3.
139. Id. at 4.
140. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 92, at 1059.
141. Id. at 1061.
142. 403 U.S. 15 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
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draft" printed on the defendant's jacket, the "offensive" lan-
guage alone could not justify his conviction.143
The result appears to be that the doctrine has not been
explicitly overruled, but the Court will carefully scrutinize
any convictions resulting from speech construed to be "fight-
ing words."' 44 The practical result is that any statute at-
tempting to proscribe expression under the "fighting words"
doctrine is required to satisfy strict-scrutiny judicial
review. 145
b. Laws Impacting Speech Must Satisfy Strict-
Scrutiny Review
Generally speaking, because content-based regulations
significantly infringe on an individual's First Amendment ex-
pressive freedoms, such regulation can be upheld only if the
legislation survives strict-scrutiny judicial review.' 46  In
short, the government must show that the regulation is nec-
essary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is nar-
rowly drawn to achieve this interest. 147 The first part of
strict-scrutiny judicial review requires that the government
demonstrate that the regulation serves a compelling interest,
not merely a legitimate, important, or even substantial con-
cern. 148 The second element the government must satisfy is
that the regulation be narrowly tailored to further the inter-
est. 149 In other words, the law must be carefully drafted to
143. Id. at 22.
144. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 92, at 1062.
145. See e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992), in
which the Court was bound by the lower court's construction that the St. Paul
ordinance reached only expression that constituted "fighting words." Id. Nev-
ertheless, the Court found that the specific kinds of "fighting words" targeted in
the ordinance was protected expression under the First Amendment; thus, the
ordinance was subjected to and failed to satisfy strict-scrutiny judicial review.
Id. at 2550.
146. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
147. See GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 608-09.
148. Id. In Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), a state university made
its facilities available to registered student groups, but refused to allow a stu-
dent religious group to meet anywhere on the campus. Id. This refusal was
part of a general policy that banned the use of university facilities "for purposes
of religious worship or religious teaching." Id. at 265. The Widmar Court held
that the ban violated the religious group's First Amendment right of free
speech, because the University could not show a compelling state interest. Id.
at 276.
149. See GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 608-09. In Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312
(1988), a Washington, D.C. regulation designed to protect the dignity of foreign
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avoid regulating activity that is permissible under the First
Amendment.
A third element that the United States Supreme Court
has sometimes used is a "least restrictive means" test.150
This test acknowledges that the legislature may have a com-
pelling interest, but "that purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifles fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of
legislative abridgment must be viewed in light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose." 15 1 Thus, the
Court occasionally requires that the legislature use means
that are the "least restrictive" when silencing speech. 152
2. Treatment of Expressive Conduct: The O'Brien
Guidelines
Certain forms of "expressive conduct,"153 or speech in-
tended to convey a message, are protected under the First
Amendment.15  The apparent significance of viewing sub-
stantive penal hate crime law as regulation of expressive con-
duct instead of pure expression is that the government has
greater interest in regulating the conduct elements of the ex-
pression, so long as the state's interest is unrelated to the
speaker's intended message.' 55
diplomats prohibited the display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign em-
bassy if the sign tended to bring that foreign government into "public odium" or
"public disrepute." Id. at 315. The Court struck down the regulation, holding
that a more narrowly drawn means would adequately protect the foreign diplo-
mats' dignity. Id. at 329.
150. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 92, at 952.
151. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnotes omitted).
152. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 92, at 952. The "least restrictive
means" test has been viewed as inconsistent with the "narrowly-tailored" re-
quirement. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), reh'g de-
nied, 492 U.S. 937 (1989). See also supra note 117.
153. "Expressive conduct" is defined as conduct that combines speech and
non-speech elements. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968),
reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968) (setting forth guidelines to determine the con-
stitutionality of expressive conduct).
154. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (stating that
non-verbal conduct is sufficiently expressive if the actor intended "to convey a
particularized message" and "the likelihood was great that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it"). See also Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931) (displaying a red flag is speech protected by the First
Amendment).
155. See GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 1224.
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For example, in United States v. O'Brien,56 the defend-
ant was charged with burning his draft card in protest of the
Vietnam War, thereby violating a draft law making it a crime
"to knowingly destroy [or] mutilate" a draft card. 157 The
United States Supreme Court upheld the law because con-
duct combining "speech" (opposing the war) and "non-speech"
(burning the draft card) could be regulated when it complied
with four guidelines.15 8  First, the government must show
that it has constitutional authority to regulate the conduct.159
Second, the regulation must further an important or substan-
tial governmental interest. 16 0 Third, the regulation must be
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 16 Finally,
the incidental restriction on the individual's expressive rights
must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 162
The government satisfied the O'Brien guidelines in Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence.163 In Clark, a group
of demonstrators sought to sleep overnight in a national park
to protest alleged governmental indifference to the homeless-
ness problem. 16 4 The United States Supreme Court upheld
the regulation banning sleeping in public parks, despite the
demonstrators' contention that their acts constituted sym-
bolic expression that dramatized the plight of the
homeless. 165
Nevertheless, courts have overturned a number of con-
victions because the government could not satisfy the O'Brien
guidelines. In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 66 the United
States Supreme Court held that protected expressive activity
included the right to peacefully demonstrate.'6 7 In addition,
a federal appellate court in Collin v. Smith 68 upheld the
156. 391 U.S. 367 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968).
157. Id. at 370.
158. Id. at 377.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
162. Id.
163. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
164. Id. at 288.
165. Id. at 295. In Clark, the Court equated the O'Brien guidelines with the
"time, place, and manner" test. Id. at 294. See supra note 117 for a discussion
of the "time, place, and manner" test.
166. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
167. Id. at 152.
168. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
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right of neo-Nazis to march in front of government
buildings. 169
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court provided
solid First Amendment protection to an individual's right to
burn the American flag. In Texas v. Johnson,170 the United
States Supreme Court upheld an individual's right to burn
the American flag. 17 1 In Johnson, the Court invalidated a
statute that criminalized the burning of an American flag
and held that "the government may not prohibit the expres-
sion of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself of-
fensive or disagreeable." 172 The Johnson Court determined
that the O'Brien guidelines did not apply, since Texas was
pursuing an interest directly related to the suppression of
free expression. 173 It therefore applied a strict-scrutiny judi-
cial review, and the statute was struck down.174 The Court
stated that "[t]he First Amendment does not guarantee that
other concepts virtually sacred to our Nation as a whole-
such as the principle that discrimination on the basis or race
is odious and destructive-will go unquestioned in the mar-
ketplace of ideas."'75 Similarly, in United States v. Eich-
man, 76 a more recent flag-burning case, the Court deter-
mined that the Flag Protection Act 1 77 enacted in response to
Johnson was content-based and did not satisfy strict-scrutiny
judicial review. 178
In sum, the Court has applied the O'Brien guidelines on
a case-by-case basis, leading to mixed results. The trend,
however, seems to indicate that the judicial standard is a
fairly narrow one. Yet, when the Court cannot find a reason-
ably expressive element in conduct, such activity will not be
afforded First Amendment protection. 79 The next section
169. Id. at 1210.
170. 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
171. Id. at 418.
172. Id. at 414.
173. Id. at 407.
174. Id. at 412, 420.
175. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989).
176. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
177. 18 U.S.C.A. § 700 (Supp. 1990) repealed by United States v. Eichman,
110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
178. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2409.
179. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of conduct that lacks an ex-
pressive element, see infra text accompanying notes 180-206.
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discusses the Court's treatment of conduct that, as a whole,
lacks expressive elements.
3. Treatment of Conduct Lacking Expressive Elements:
Violence and Other Discriminatory Acts Are
Not Constitutionally Protected
The Court has been generally reluctant to give First
Amendment protection to any act that may incidentally con-
vey a message.' 80 Thus, the Court has allowed conduct to be
regulated, even if it is initiated by speech. For example, in
Cox v. Louisiana,'8' the Court upheld a statute that banned
the picketing of any courthouse because the statute regulated
the conduct of picketing, rather than any bona fide expres-
sion.112 The Court reasoned that the presence of speech did
not prevent the state from regulating the defendant's conduct
in order to "vindicate important interests of society." 1 3 The
Court also stated that "it ha[d] never been deemed an abridg-
ment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of con-
duct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated,
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spo-
ken, written, or printed."18 4
The reason for providing narrow, if any, protection to
conduct that lacks expressive elements stems from the con-
cern that broad protection would permit violent acts.'8 5 With
substantive penal hate crime prior to R.A.V. and Mitchell,
constitutional scholars indicated that Congress or the states
may constitutionally criminalize hate crimes and punish such
crimes more severely and vigorously than simple acts of van-
dalism. 16 Further, these scholars stated that the hate or ter-
rorism element of these crimes allows Congress or the states
to further punish the perpetrator because the hate aspect of
180. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)
181. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
182. Id. at 563.
183. Id. at 564.
184. Id. at 563. But see Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (pro-
viding sweeping First Amendment protection to similar activity as in the Cox
case).
185. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982).
See infra at text accompanying notes 190-198 for a discussion of Claiborne.
186. See 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 351 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter Ro-
TUNDA & NowAK, TREATISE].
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these crimes affects both the harm and the likelihood of re-
peat offenses.
1 8 7
The Court stated in several cases that although peaceful
acts, such as picketing"' and demonstrations,' 8 9 are pro-
tected activity, "[t]he First Amendment does not protect vio-
lence."' 90 In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,191 NAACP
members launched a boycott against a group of white
merchants to secure compliance with equality and racial jus-
tice. 192 The boycott resulted in threats of reprisal and violent
conduct. 193  The Court distinguished between the boycott's
violent and non-violent conduct and held that only the non-
violent elements were entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion.' In addition, in Boos v. Barry,195 the Court held that
"where demonstrations turn violent, they lose their protected
quality as expression under the First Amendment."' 96
With regard to substantive penal hate crime legislation,
prosecutors have successfully argued that these laws regu-
late the perpetrator's violent conduct, not his or her thoughts
or speech. In People v. Grupe,'9 7 a New York appellate court
upheld a substantive penal hate crime law, stating, "[t]he
statute does not attempt to prohibit bigotry itself. The indi-
vidual's freedom to think, and indeed, speak, publish[,] or
broadcast views on the subjects of race, religion[,] or ethnicity
are not regulated by this [hate crime] law. Violent conduct is
what is being regulated."198
Violent conduct may also be outside First Amendment
protection because such acts are not normally intended to ex-
187. Id.
188. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (holding that a statute
applied to ban all picketing was unconstitutional).
189. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (holding that a
charge of parading without a permit in violation of a city ordinance is
unconstitutional).
190. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 889. The boycott occurred after the NAACP failed to receive a
satisfactory response to African-American citizens' demand for racial equality
and integration. Id.
193. Id. at 916.
194. Id. at 918.
195. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
196. Id. at 331 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104. 116
(1972)).
197. 532 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
198. Id. at 818.
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press a message. For example, in Spence v. Washington,'9 9
the Court held that activity must intend to express a particu-
lar message, or it will not fall within First Amendment pro-
tections.2 °° In addition, constitutional scholars have stated
that even if conduct constitutes a "political act" such as assas-
sination, the First Amendment does not offer protection for
criminal acts committed with political motives.20 1 Outside
the hate crime context, the United States Supreme Court
held that the act of excluding persons of color from private
institutions is not protected under the First Amendment, de-
spite the members' protected beliefs of desiring the exclusion
of others based upon race.20 2
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the United States
Supreme Court generally provided the most protection to ex-
pression construed as speech. Thus, any legislative attempts
to regulate such expression must fall under a categorical ex-
ception (fighting words, defamation, or obscenity) or survive
strict-scrutiny judicial review. "Expressive conduct," or con-
duct that is a substitute for speech, is afforded less protec-
tion, so long as the regulation is not suppressing the content
of the message; any challenged regulation must be scruti-
nized under the guidelines set forth in United States v.
O'Brien.2 °3 Violent activity, or conduct lacking expressive el-
ements, is not protected under the First Amendment, and the
Court has allowed the government to regulate these
activities.20 4
In sum, the constitutional issues raised in United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence preceding the R.A.V. case fo-
cused on the scope and limits of expression and expressive
activity, as well as the requirement that substantive penal
hate crime laws comply with due process. 20 5 The R.A. V. case
is important because it affirms that First Amendment princi-
ples protect expression. The R.A.V. decision extended protec-
tion much further than previous cases, because it implied
that all forms of content-based regulations, including the
199. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
200. Id. at 409.
201. See ROTUNDA & NOwAK, TREATISE, supra note 186, at 351-52.
202. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976).
203. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
204. For a more elaborate discussion of this issue, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 180-204.
205. See generally supra text accompanying notes 76-110.
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"categorical exceptions," need to satisfy strict-scrutiny judi-
cial review.2 °6 The Mitchell case clarified some of the unan-
swered First Amendment questions posed in R.A.V., but the
Mitchell holding is probably limited to the constitutionality of
hate crime penalty-enhancement statutes. Other avenues of
ensuring the constitutionality of substantive penal hate
crime legislation must be explored.
III. THE PROBLEM FACING LEGISLATORS: SUBSTANTIVE
PENAL HATE CRIME LEGISLATION MUST COMPLY
WITH R.A. V, MITCHELL, AND DUE
PROCESS PRINCIPLES
Assuming that there exists a compelling need for sub-
stantive penal hate crime legislation, legislators currently
face a number of problems that need to be resolved.20 7 First,
legislators must grasp the First Amendment principles set
forth in the R.A.V. and Mitchell decisions to ensure the con-
stitutionality of their substantive penal hate crime laws.
Specifically, legislators need to recognize the constitutional
difference between regulating speech and conduct.
Second, legislators must recognize that it is difficult to
discern whether a law is regulating speech or conduct. "Ex-
pressive conduct," which falls somewhere between speech
and conduct, is a "gray area" that must be understood and
considered under the guidelines pronounced in United States
v. O'Brien.208 Although expressive conduct was not ad-
dressed by the R.A.V. majority,2 °9 this area of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence is still a critical consideration for
legislators.
Third, issues not addressed by the majority in R.A. V., but
requiring legislative attention, are due process principles
threatened by imprecisely drafted substantive penal hate
crime legislation. Specifically, substantive penal hate crime
206. See infra text accompanying notes 221-245.
207. On a practical level, the newness and scope of the R.AV. and Mitchell
decisions spark legislative concerns. Because these cases were decided re-
cently, legislators nationwide are uncertain how these decisions affect their cur-
rent substantive penal hate crime laws. See supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
208. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
209. The R.A.V. majority was not required to construe the St. Paul ordinance
as expressive conduct, because the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation
was that the law regulated pure expression. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.
Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992).
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legislation must be carefully drafted to withstand vagueness
and overbreadth concerns.21 ° In the case of procedural penal
hate crime provisions, however, the Mitchell Court decided
that penalty-enhancement statutes were not unconstitution-
ally overbroad.2 1'
IV. ANALYSIS: THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN R.A. V, DuE
PROCESS MANDATES, AND THE MITCHELL DECISION
A. The R.A.V. Decision: Facts, Analysis and Principles Set
Forth
The R.A. V. case is integrally related to the constitutional
problems posed in substantive penal hate crime legislation
because it forces legislators to sort out what activity they are
targeting and sets forth principles of what is permissible
under these laws. It is therefore critically important to un-
derstand the R.A.V. opinion so that substantive penal hate
crime laws comply with the decision. This section discusses
the facts and decision of the R.A.V. case and extracts the
principles legislators must apply to current and prospective
substantive penal hate crime legislation.
1. R.A.V. Facts and Procedural Posture
R.A.V. and several other teenagers taped two pieces of a
broken chair together, forming a cross, entered an African-
American family's yard, and burned the cross on the
lawn.2 12 Local prosecutors brought disorderly conduct
charges against R.A.V., who was the defendant and peti-
tioner, after he was arrested and accused of burning the cross
on the family's lawn.2 13
For the first time, St. Paul prosecutors used a bias-moti-
vated hate crime ordinance, which made it an offense to place
on public or private property a symbol that one knows
arouses anger on the basis of race, religion, or gender.21 4
Specifically, the challenged ordinance, Minnesota Legislative
Code Section 292.02, provided:
210. For an overview regarding an individual's due process rights, see supra
text accompanying notes 92-108. See infra text accompanying notes 296-304 for
additional analysis of due process issues.
211. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201 (1993).
212. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
213. Id.
214. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2541 (1992).
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Whoever places on public or private property a symbol,
object, appellation, characterization[,] or graffiti, includ-
ing, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika,
which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion[,] or gender[,] commits disor-
derly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.215
The defendant moved to dismiss this count, alleging the
St. Paul ordinance was substantially overbroad and imper-
missibly content-based, and therefore facially invalid under
the First Amendment.216 The trial court granted his motion,
but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the de-
fendant's overbreadth claim, because as construed in prior
Minnesota cases, the modifying phrase "arouses anger,
alarm[,] or resentment in others" limited the reach of the or-
dinance to "fighting words" and thus reached only expression
"that the [F]irst [A]mendment does not protect."
217
The Minnesota Supreme Court also concluded that the
ordinance was not impermissibly content-based, because, in
its view, "the ordinance [was] a narrowly tailored means to-
ward accomplishing the compelling governmental interest in
protecting the community against bias-motivated threats to
public safety and order."218  The United Supreme Court
granted certiorari 21 9 and reversed the Minnesota Supreme
Court's judgment. 220
The R.A.V. case announces a number of significant prin-
ciples relevant to substantive penal hate crime legislation,
because the holding broadens an individual's expressive free-
dom and limits the government to impose content-based reg-
ulations. The following section fully explains R.A.V.'s
principles.
2. R.A.V. Holding: Content-Based Regulation on
Speech Is Presumptively Invalid
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, stated
that even if all of the expression reached by the St. Paul ordi-
nance was proscribable under the "fighting words" doctrine,
215. MiNN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
216. R.AV., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 2542.
219. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992).
220. Id. at 2541, 2550.
1994]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
the ordinance was nonetheless facially unconstitutional be-
cause it prohibited otherwise protected speech solely on the
content of the subjects the speech addressed. 221 The heart of
Justice Scalia's opinion lies in an "underbreadth" analysis;
i.e., the St. Paul ordinance was unconstitutional because it
did not criminalize all fighting words.222 Rather, the ordi-
nance singled out certain expression that causes anger or re-
sentment on the basis of race, gender, or other protected
status.223
The Court in R.A.V. then announced that all content-
based regulations are presumptively invalid.224 The Court
conceded that although its past decisions held that fighting
words, obscenity, and defamation were categories "not within
the area of constitutionally protected speech," this statement
must be placed into context.225 Essentially, the Court clari-
fied that fighting words, obscenity, and defamation are not
categories of speech that are entirely invisible to the Consti-
tution.226 These areas may be regulated because of their con-
stitutionally proscribable content, so long as the content dis-
crimination is unrelated to the distinct message contained in
the expression.227
For example, the government may proscribe libel, but it
may not make further content discrimination of proscribing
only libel critical of the government.228 Despite earlier U.S.
Supreme Court decisions indicating otherwise,229 the major-
ity disagreed that fighting words have at most a de minimis
expressive content, or that their content is in all respects
"worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection."230
The majority stated that earlier U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions did not say that fighting words were judged to consti-
tute "no part in the expression of ideas."231 Rather, the ma-
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2541.
223. Id. at 2547-49.
224. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547-49 (1992).
225. Id. at 2543.
226. Id. at 2541.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) ("obscenity");
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) ("defamation"); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 ("fighting words").
230. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543-44 (1992).
231. Id. at 2544.
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jority clarified the "fighting words" principle, stating that
they constitute "no essential part of any exposition of
ideas."23
2
3. Regulation Affecting Pure Expression Upheld Only
if It Satisfies Strict-Scrutiny Judicial Review
The R.A.V. majority appears to have severely limited reg-
ulation of certain categories of speech.233 The Court adopted
a balancing approach, with a heavy burden on the govern-
ment to satisfy strict-scrutiny judicial review.234 Possible in
theory but difficult in reality, legislation that infringes on a
fundamental right may nevertheless be upheld if the govern-
ment can demonstrate that the law is narrowly drafted to fur-
ther a compelling state end.235
The difficulty of overcoming strict-scrutiny judicial re-
view was apparent in R.A.V. 236 The Court stated that it is
the responsibility, if not the obligation, of diverse communi-
ties to confront bias-motivated hate messages.237 The man-
ner of confrontation, however, may not consist of selective
limitations upon speech.238 The Court indicated that the
point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences be
expressed in ways other than content-based regulation.239
In applying strict-scrutiny judicial review, the Court ac-
knowledged that St. Paul had a compelling interest; i.e., en-
suring that members of the community were free from dis-
criminatory intimidation, but that the means employed-an
ordinance that regulated based upon content and viewpoint-
went too far.24 ° In other words, the government failed to
meet the "narrowly tailored" requirement, so the ordinance
was struck down.24
1
The majority remarked that "St. Paul has sufficient
means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without ad-
232. Id. Although the R.A.V. case was a nine-to-zero decision, the concurring
justices resoundingly criticized the majority's approach.
233. Id. at 2545.
234. Id. at 2549-50.
235. For a discussion of strict-scrutiny judicial review, see supra note 119.
236. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2550 (1992).
237. Id. at 2548.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 2550.
241. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2550 (1992).
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ding the First Amendment to the fire."242 The Court pointed
out that St. Paul could have charged the defendant with ter-
roristic threats, arson, or criminal damage to property in-
stead of using the expression-regulating ordinance.243 These
other available avenues appear to be important to the Court,
because penalizing cross-burning under an arson statute, for
example, demonstrates a less restrictive means of getting the
same results; i.e., punishing the defendant's behavior, with-
out implicating the First Amendment.244 In other words,
even though the legislature has a compelling interest in pro-
tecting minorities from discrimination, the ordinance failed
because St. Paul could not demonstrate that its ordinance
was the least restrictive means of combating St. Paul's hate
crime problem. Thus, the St. Paul ordinance was struck
down because the ordinance's content and viewpoint discrimi-
nation were not reasonably necessary to achieve the city's
compelling interests in ensuring the civil rights of racial mi-
norities and other protected groups.245 As noted in the next
242. Id.
243. Id. at 2541 n.1.
244. For a discussion of the "least restrictive means" test, see supra text ac-
companying notes 150-152.
245. Although all the justices in R.A.V. voted to strike down the ordinance,
four concurring justices bitterly opposed the majority's rationale and analysis.
Justice White wrote that the ordinance at issue was fatally overbroad, "because
it criminalizes not only unprotected expression but expression protected by the
First Amendment." R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550 (White, J., concurring). Justice
White wrote that the Court's new "underbreadth" creation served no desirable
function. Id.
Justice Blackmun agreed that the ordinance should be invalidated because
of overbreadth. Id. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He argued, however,
that no First Amendment values were being compromised by a law "that pro-
hibits hoodlums from driving minorities out of their homes by burning crosses
on their lawns [and causes] great harm in preventing the people of St. Paul
from specifically punishing the race-based fighting words that so prejudice their
community." Id.
Justice Stevens felt that the ordinance was overbroad but not invalid, and
believed in upholding the content-based approach, criticizing the majority for
its near-absolute ban on content-based regulation. Id. at 2550, 2562 (Stevens,
J., concurring). He stated that even though the ordinance singled out threats
based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender, the regulation was nevertheless
justifiable, because those kinds of threats cause more harm to society and indi-
viduals than others. Id. at 2565. Justice Stevens argued that content-based
distinctions are an inevitable and indispensable aspect of First Amendment law
and that the Court must consider the content and context of regulated speech
and the scope of restrictions. Id. at 2567. In addition, he noted that the St.
Paul ordinance regulated low-value speech, or "fighting words," and only ex-
pressive conduct, not written or spoken words. Id. at 2569. Justice Stevens
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section, however, the Court announced certain exceptions
where content-based regulations are appropriate, keeping
alive the possibility of substantively proscribing hate
conduct.
4. R.A.V. Enumerated Exceptions Where Content-
Based Regulation Is Permissible
The majority in R.A.V. provided two ad hoc exceptions
that allow content-based regulation,246 because the Court
was satisfied that the exceptions would not involve the sup-
pression of protected expression.247 The Court conceded that
the prohibition against content discrimination is not abso-
lute.248 The majority explained that the applicable standards
are different in the context of proscribable speech than in the
area of fully protected speech.249 It explained that content
discrimination among various classes of proscribable speech
often does not pose a threat to drive certain ideas or view-
points from the marketplace.2 5 °
The first exception allows content-based regulation if the
regulation is neutral enough to support exclusion of the en-
tire class of speech from protection. 25' The second exception
allows content-based regulation for expression with "secon-
dary effects" with no reference to the content of the speech.252
The Court stated that the "secondary effects" could stem from
conduct elements of the expression.253
The significance of the R.A.V. exceptions for substantive
penal hate crime laws is that they allow hate crime legisla-
tion in compliance with the Court's guidelines. The R.A.V.
exceptions setting forth the Court's guidelines are explained
below.
contended that the defendant "is free to burn a cross or express racial
supremacy, so long as the burning is not so threatening and so directed at an
individual as to by its very execution inflict injury." Id. at 2571.
246. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545-46 (1992).
247. Id. at 2547.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2545.
250. Id. (citing Simon & Schuster v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 112 S. Ct. 508 (1991)).
251. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545 (1992).
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a. Regulation That Is Subject- and Viewpoint-
Neutral
Under the first R.A.V. exception, "[w]hen the basis for
the content discrimination consists entirely of the very rea-
son the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no sig-
nificant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists."254
The fatal language in the St. Paul ordinance was that it pro-
hibited reprehensible expression based on race, color, creed,
religion, or gender.255 The R.A. V. majority stated that the or-
dinance not only constituted content-based regulation, but
also viewpoint regulation.256 The Court noted that the un-
modified words contained in the ordinance clearly made the
ordinance apply only to fighting words that insult or provoke
violence, on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender,
constituting discrimination based on an unfavorable view-
point.257 The Court therefore rejected the ordinance, stating
that "the First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to im-
pose special prohibitions on those speakers who express
views on disfavored subjects."25 The significance of this ex-
ception to substantive penal hate crime laws is that if the aim
of the legislation clearly indicates that its purpose is to regu-
late violent conduct for the purpose of ensuring that all indi-
viduals have the right to be free from harm, it should be
constitutional.
b. Regulation That Proscribes Conduct, Not
Speech
The second exception applies when "the subclass hap-
pens to be associated with particular 'secondary effects' of the
speech, so that the regulation is 'justified without reference to
the content of the . . . speech .... 259 In other words, a
particular content-based sub-category of a proscribable class
of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a
statute directed at conduct rather than at speech. 26 0 Addi-
254. Id. at 2545.
255. Id. at 2548.
256. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 2546 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48
(1986)).
260. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992). For a discussion
of "secondary effects" theory, see supra note 117.
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tionally, the Court stated that "[wihere the government does
not target conduct on the basis of its expressive conduct, acts
are not shielded from regulation merely because they express
a discriminatory idea or philosophy."261 Rather, a law that
regulates discriminatory conduct may in fact be constitu-
tional.262 Thus, where a regulation is devised to target vio-
lent conduct, not speech, it would be constitutional. In sum,
any regulation of speech from a carefully drafted statute
aimed at conduct would be incidental and should withstand
constitutional muster.
Although not specifically enumerated as an exception,
the Court in R.A.V. left open the possibility of regulating as-
saults and violent threats.263 Using the R.A.V. case as a
guide, the next section analyzes the Court's treatment of
these areas.
c. Regulation That Targets Assaults and Violent
Threats
The R.A.V. majority left open regulation of speech in the
form of assault and threats.264 The Court stated that the St.
Paul ordinance failed because it singled out offensive speech
and made such expression illegal.265 In other words, the reg-
ulation improperly regulated content of the expressed
message.
Because the Court said that only purely offensive speech
is protected, it left open the possibility of proscribing physi-
cally threatening acts. Assault and threats may be regulated
for two reasons. First, like "fighting words," violent threats
contain particularly intolerable and socially unnecessary
modes of expressing ideas.266 Second, assaults and physical
threats should be viewed as conduct if the activity is targeted
at an intended victim and is believed by a reasonable person
in the community to result in physical harm.
2 67
261. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546-47.
262. For an explanation of why conduct lacking an expressive element may
not be protected under the First Amendment, see supra text accompanying
notes 180-204.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 185-196.
264. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
265. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549-50 (1992).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 2549. The R.AV. majority stated that St. Paul failed to single out
an especially offensive mode of expression. Id. For example, St. Paul did not
1994]
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The effect of the Court leaving open the possibility of reg-
ulating physically threatening acts is that it remains permis-
sible for legislators to regulate dangerous behavior, even if
the perpetrator did not actually physically harm the victim.
This is important because the imminent threat of physical
harm could be as damaging as actual contact.
B. Additional Constitutional Considerations Not Addressed
in R.A.V.: The O'Brien Guidelines and Due
Process Requirements
The majority opinion in the R.A.V. decision indicates
that speech content is strongly protected under the First
Amendment.268 On the other hand, the R.A.V. decision al-
lows conduct and threatening forms of expression to be regu-
lated.269 What the majority did not address is whether the
activity the defendant engaged in (i.e., burning the cross on
the family's lawn) was expressive conduct rather than
speech.2 7 0 The Court apparently was not required to inter-
pret the ordinance as expressive conduct, because the Minne-
sota Supreme Court construed it to reach only speech.2 7 1 The
expressive conduct guidelines enumerated in United States v.
O'Brien272 require that the law avoid regulation based on
content, and also that the government show that the regula-
tion is carefully drafted to advance an important or substan-
tial state interest.2 7 3
The O'Brien guidelines are easier to meet than the re-
quirements of strict-scrutiny. 274 The next section breaks
down the O'Brien elements with regard to substantive penal
hate crime legislation and analyzes how the government may
satisfy these guidelines.
select for prohibition only those fighting words that communicate ideas in a
threatening manner. Id. at 2549.
268. Id. at 2542.
269. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549 (1992).
270. The R.A.V. Court was limited by the lower court's interpretation of the
ordinance, which was construed to regulate pure expression rather than expres-
sive conduct. Id. at 2541.
271. Id.
272. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
273. Id. at 377.
274. See GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 1224.
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1. Satisfying the O'Brien Guidelines
Legislation construed to regulate expressive conduct may
be upheld if the government satisfies the guidelines set forth
in United States v. O'Brien.275 On the other hand, if the law
intends to regulate conduct rather than expressive activity,
the government need not satisfy O'Brien because the govern-
ment would be pursuing interests unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression. 6
The O'Brien guidelines apply when a substantive penal
hate crime law is construed by a court as regulating "expres-
sive conduct" rather than speech. "[W]hen 'speech and non-
speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct,
a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating
the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms."277 The key here is that the lim-
itations on conduct must be incidental and not intended to
suppress the speaker's message. The court, in such an in-
stance, should carefully review the language of the statute to
determine whether it proscribes speech or conduct. If a regu-
lation were construed to proscribe "expressive conduct," the
government would be required to demonstrate that the stat-
ute adheres to the following guidelines: (1) regulating the
conduct is within the constitutional power of government; (2)
the regulation furthers an important or substantial govern-
ment interest; (3) the government interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restric-
tion on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of the governmental inter-
est.2 7 8 Listed below are the O'Brien elements and descrip-
tions of what the government must demonstrate.
a. The Regulation Must Be Within the
Government's Constitutional Power
This element is undoubtedly the easiest to satisfy. All
the government needs to show is that it has been granted
275. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
276. For an explanation of why conduct lacking an expressive element is not
afforded First Amendment protection, see supra text accompanying notes 180-
204.
277. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
278. Id. at 377.
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constitutional power to regulate the conduct at issue. 279 Reg-
ulating hate crimes falls within the state's police powers
under the Tenth Amendment.28 0 Further, it is within the
constitutional power of the government to regulate hate
crime activity, because of potential for retaliatory activity
and civil unrest, which would infect and harm the entire com-
munity.28 ' Moreover, recidivism is more likely to occur if
hate activity were not deterred by criminal sanctions.282
b. The Regulation Must Further an Important or
Substantial Governmental Interest
This phrase is analogous to an "ends" inquiry under in-
termediate-scrutiny judicial review.283 This element may be
a relatively difficult hurdle to overcome, because the govern-
ment must justify the value of the regulation. The govern-
ment, however, need satisfy only one of the two modifying
terms. The government must demonstrate that the ends are
either "important" or at least "substantial."28 4 The "substan-
tial" standard is easier to meet than the "important" stan-
dard because "substantial" has been construed by one consti-
tutional law scholar to mean "plausible but little more."28 5 A
279. Id. at 376. This prong of the O'Brien guidelines was adopted, because
the Selective Service Act was federal legislation and had to arise from Congress'
constitutionally enumerated powers; the O'Brien Court stated that the power of
Congress to classify and conscript manpower for military service is "beyond
question." Id.
280. The tenth amendment provides, "the powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
281. For a discussion of the serious nature about hate crime activity, see
supra text accompanying notes 36-48.
282. For discussion of the legislature's concern of hate crime recidivism if not
deterred by regulation, see supra text accompanying note 187.
283. Intermediate-scrutiny judicial review requires that gender-based classi-
fications serve important governmental objectives and also be substantially re-
lated to achievement of those objectives. See GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 605-06.
See also, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (adopting intermediate-scru-
tiny judicial review to gender-based classifications).
284. See GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 605-06.
285. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Cate-
gorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482
(1975) (arguing that the Court in O'Brien placed a trivial functional significance
to the critical word "substantial").
For an example illustrating the relaxed application of this element, see
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), where the Court stated that
the issuance of draft card registration certificates was a legitimate and substan-
tial administrative aid in the functioning of a system to locate individuals liable
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court, however, would probably not concede such laxity in the
use of either term. Therefore, lawmakers must note that the
term "important" really should be the standard they need to
satisfy. Compared to a strict-scrutiny requirement of a "com-
pelling" end, to demonstrate a "substantial" or "important"
interest would be pose a lesser burden on the government.
Substantive penal hate crime laws further an important or
substantial governmental interest, because they deter poten-
tially illegal and destructive activity brought on by other
groups' retaliatory efforts. Therefore, the government should
raise the argument that it be empowered to take affirmative
steps to alleviate the hate crime problem.
c. Government's Interest Must Be Unrelated to the
Suppression of the Expressive Content
The government must show that the purpose of the law
is not content-based. It must show another reason why it
proscribed the behavior "unrelated to the suppression of the
expressive content."28 6 For example, in United States v.
O'Brien,28 7 the Court stated that the government met this
guideline because the unrestrained destruction of draft cards
would disrupt the smooth functioning of the Selective Service
System.288
Within the substantive penal hate crime context, the
governmental interest in preventing the effects of hate crime
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, because its
interest in preventing massive violence resulting from the
bias-motivated conduct is unrelated to the expression's con-
tent. This point could be bolstered if the statute is worded to
proscribe conduct rather than speech. R.A.V., in contrast,
contained a content-based ordinance whose purpose related
directly to the suppression of the message expressed. 2 9 For
that reason, the Court struck down the St. Paul ordinance.
for military training and service. Id. Further, the Court stated that legislation
ensuring the continuing availability of issued draft card certificates served a
legitimate and substantial purpose in the draft system's administration. Id.
286. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
287. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
288. Id. at 386 (1968). But see Dean Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Con-
duct, 1968 SUPREME COURT REV. 1 (1969) (arguing that many members of Con-
gress and the legislative history of the Selective Service Act supported the
amendment precisely for the reason that it was designed to combat the burning
of draft cards).
289. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2550 (1992).
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The R.A.V. majority, however, did not construe the ordinance
as reaching expressive conduct,290 and therefore the Court
presumably did not need to analyze the O'Brien guidelines.
The state also may be able to meet this content-neutral
requirement based on a "secondary effects" theory.291' Apply-
ing this theory, the state could argue that the purpose of the
law is not to regulate one's expressive thoughts. Rather, the
law's aim is to preserve the safety and peace of the affected
community; therefore, regulating only certain forms of harm-
ful conduct should be permissible.292
d. Any Incidental Restriction on First Amendment
Rights Must Be No Greater Than Is
Essential to the Furtherance of the
Governmental Interest
The O'Brien requirement that any incidental restriction
of First Amendment rights must be no greater than is essen-
tial to the furtherance of the governmental interest serves
two functions. First, the term "incidental restriction"293 pro-
vides assurance that the regulation is not aimed at regulat-
ing content. Second, the phrase "no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of the governmental interest"294 serves to
scrutinize the "means" of the regulation.295
There may be incidental restrictions on expression under
an O'Brien analysis. Within the substantive penal hate
crime context, an individual may contend that a statute that
regulates bias-motivated conduct is suppressing his or her
First Amendment right to publicly express beliefs. The gov-
ernment, however, may demonstrate that any alleged restric-
tion on speech is substantially outweighed by the state's in-
terest in preventing violent retaliatory conduct stemming
from the initial bias-motivated incident. A law aimed at pun-
ishing harmful conduct should accomplish the government's
goals in deterring hate violence. In other words, although the
290. Id. at 2542.
291. For an overview of "secondary effects" theory, see supra note 117. For
the "secondary effects" discussion in R.A. V., see supra text accompanying notes
259-262.
292. For a description of the serious effects of hate crime on victims' physical
and psychological well-being, see supra text accompanying notes 36-48.
293. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
294. Id.
295. See GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 1224.
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government cannot prohibit the individual from thinking or
espousing beliefs, it has a compelling interest in preventing
harmful conduct that is perpetrated in furtherance of those
beliefs. A carefully drafted law should be able to provide a
constitutional means for furthering this compelling interest.
In addition to not addressing the O'Brien guidelines in
the R.A.V. decision, the Court did not address other critical
issues, such as the requirements of avoiding vagueness or
overbreadth.2 96 These issues remain important to ensure that
an individual receives adequate due process protections.29 7
The next section discusses ways in which legislators can com-
ply with due process guarantees.
2. Complying with Due Process Requirements: Curing
Vagueness and Overbreadth With a Specific
Intent Element
Legislators must avoid drafting laws that are unconstitu-
tionally vague or that are overbroad, because such laws in-
fringe on an individual's due process rights.2 98 The following
discussion suggests that including a specific intent require-
ment in the statute should remedy these problems.
Both vagueness 299 and overbreadth 30 0 may be cured in
two ways. First, the law must be precisely drafted, specifying
what acts are proscribable.3 ° ' Second, the law should include
a specific intent element.3 °2 Specifically laying out what
kinds of intentional conduct are proscribed provides the indi-
vidual with notice and warning that his or her activity may
be punished. 3  If the regulation clearly indicates what con-
296. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) (stating that
it is unnecessary to address whether the St. Paul ordinance was overbroad, be-
cause the Court had already decided to strike down the ordinance as facially
unconstitutional).
297. For a discussion of due process principles, see supra text accompanying
notes 92-108. See infra text accompanying notes 299-304 for additional due
process analysis.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 93-108.
299. For an overview of vagueness, see supra text accompanying notes 93-
103.
300. For a summary of the problems regarding overbreadth, see supra text
accompanying notes 104-108.
301. For an overview of vagueness principles, see supra text accompanying
notes 93-103.
302. For a discussion of a specific intent requirement in criminal statutes,
see supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
303. For ways to cure vagueness, see supra text accompanying notes 97-103.
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duct and specific intent levels are subject to punishment, the
law should comply with due process. Examples of how draft-
ers would accomplish overcoming vagueness and overbreadth
include modifying the intent element with terms such as
"purposefully," "knowingly," or "willfully."3 °4
C. The Mitchell Decision and Its Underlying Implications
for Substantive Penal Hate Crime Legislation
The Mitchell decision is important within the area of sub-
stantive penal hate crime legislation, because it indicates
that penal statutes are valid means to attack the hate crime
problem. Since the statute challenged in the Mitchell case
was a procedural penalty-enhancement statute, rather than a
substantive regulation, however, the scope of the decision
probably does not fully resolve the constitutional problems
posed by substantive penal hate crime legislation. This sec-
tion presents the facts and holdings of the Mitchell case and
speculates on its limited applicability to substantive penal
hate crime legislation.30 5
1. Mitchell Facts and Procedural Posture
Mitchell and a group of young African-American men
and boys gathered at an apartment and discussed a scene
from the motion picture "Mississippi Burning," in which a
white man beat a young African-American boy who was pray-
ing.3 0 6 The group moved outside and Mitchell asked them,
"'Do you all feel hyped up to move on some white people?' "307
Shortly thereafter, a young white boy on the opposite side of
the street approached the group. 3°s As the boy walked by,
Mitchell said, "You all want to fuck somebody up? There goes
a white boy; go get him."30 9 Mitchell counted to three and
then pointed to the boy. 310 The group ran towards the boy
304. In the federal criminal civil rights statute, the specific intent term is
"willfully." 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988). In California's substantive penal hate crime
statute, the terms "willfully" and "knowingly" are elements of the offense. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
305. See infra text accompanying notes 306-342.
306. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2196 (1993).
307. Id. (citation omitted).
308. Id.
309. Id. at 2196-97.
310. Id. at 2197.
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and beat him severely, rendering him unconscious. 311 The
boy remained in a coma for four days.3 12
A jury convicted Mitchell of aggravated battery, pursu-
ant to Wisconsin Statute Sections 939.05 and 940.19(lm).
313
The offense ordinarily carries a maximum sentence of two
years' imprisonment, but because the jury found that the
Mitchell intentionally selected the victim based upon race,
the maximum sentence was increased to seven years under
Wisconsin Statute Section 939.645(1)(b). 314 That provision
enhances the maximum penalty for an offense whenever the
defendant "'[i]ntentionally selects the person against whom
the crime ... is committed ... because of the race, religion,
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ances-
try of that person .... 315 Mitchell was sentenced to four
years' imprisonment.16
The defendant unsuccessfully sought post-conviction re-
lief at the trial court level.3 17 Mitchell appealed his convic-
tion and sentence, challenging the constitutionality of Wis-
consin's penalty-enhancement provision based upon the First
Amendment. 318 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected his
challenge, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing the statute violated the First Amendment by punishing
offensive thought.3 19 The Wisconsin Supreme Court also re-
jected the state's contention "'that the statute punishes only
the "conduct" of [the] intentional selection of the victim.' "320
According to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, "'[t]he statute
punishes the [defendant] 'because of' aspect[s] of the defend-
ant's selection, the reason the defendant selected the victim,
[and] the motive behind the selection.' ,,321 It also reasoned
that under the R.A.V. decision, "'the Wisconsin legislature




315. Id. (quoting Wis. STAT. § 939.645(1)(b) (1989-1990) (amended 1992)).




320. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 485 N.W.2d 807, 812 (1991).
321. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2197 (1993) (quoting Mitchell,
485 N.W.2d at 812).
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cannot criminalize bigoted thought with which it
disagrees.' "322
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also held the statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad.323 In order to show that Mitch-
ell intentionally selected his victim based upon the victim's
protected status, "the State would often have to introduce evi-
dence of the defendant's prior speech, such as racial epithets
he may have uttered before the commission of the offense."324
The use of protected speech, therefore, would have a "'chil-
ling effect' on those who feared the possibility of prosecution
for offenses subject to penalty enhancement."325 In addition,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court differentiated anti-discrimina-
tion laws because the Wisconsin statute punished the "'sub-
jective mental process' of selecting the victim based on his
protected status, whereas anti-discrimination laws prohibit
objective acts of discrimination."326
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 327
because of the importance of the issue and the conflict among
state courts on the constitutionality of similar statutes. 328
The Court reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
judgment.32 9
The Mitchell case provides some guidance, albeit limited,
on the validity of substantive penal hate crime legislation.
The following subsection discusses the holding and implica-
tions of the Mitchell case.3
2. Mitchell Holding: No First Amendment Violation
Where Penalty Is Enhanced Upon a Showing of
Intentional Selection Based on Race
A unanimous Court concluded that the Wisconsin pen-
alty-enhancement provision did not violate the petitioner's
322. Id. at 2197-98 (quoting Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 815).
323. Id. at 2198.
324. Id.
325. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 485 N.W.2d 807, 816 (1991).
326. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2198 (1993) (quoting Mitchell,
485 N.W.2d at 817 (footnote omitted)).
327. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992), opinion at 113 S. Ct. 2194
(1992).
328. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2198. For examples illustrating the split of au-
thority regarding the constitutionality of hate crime penalty-enhancement stat-
utes, see supra note 14.
329. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2198.
330. See infra text accompanying notes 331-342.
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First Amendment Rights and was not unconstitutionally
overbroad.331
The Court held that "a physical assault is not, by any
stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by
the First Amendment."332 The Court stated that "'[v]iolence
or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce
special harms distinct from their communicative impact are
entitled to no constitutional protection.' "33
With regard to the petitioner's challenge that the provi-
sion impermissibly punished his protected beliefs, the Court
held that judges have traditionally "considered a wide variety
of factors bearing on guilt in determining what sentence to
impose on the convicted defendant."3 34 The Court stated that
the defendant's motive for committing the offense is an im-
portant factor to consider during the sentencing phase.3 35
The Court stated that "'the First Amendment does not erect
a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning the
defendant's beliefs at the sentencing phase, simply because
those beliefs are protected by the First Amendment.' "336 The
Court did not disturb the state's decision that "bias-moti-
vated offenses warrant greater maximum penalties across
the board," because the "primary responsibility for fixing
criminal penalties lies with the legislature."
337
In addition, the Court rejected the petitioner's over-
breadth claim, holding that the possibility that the statute
would have a chilling effect on an individual's free speech
rights was too speculative to support striking down the en-
hancement provision.338 The Court also held that "the First
Amendment does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to
establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or
intent."33
9
The status of substantive penal hate crime legislation, in
light of the Mitchell decision, has not been fully resolved be-
331. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201-02 (1993).
332. Id. at 2199 (citations omitted).
333. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916
(1982)).
334. Id. (citations omitted).
335. Id. (quoting Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1094 (1992)).
336. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2200 (1993) (quoting Dawson,
112 S. Ct. at 1094).
337. Id. (citations omitted).
338. Id. at 2201.
339. Id.
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cause the Mitchell Court upheld a hate crime penalty-en-
hancement statute.34 ° Mitchell differs from R.A. V. because it
is a procedural, rather than substantive, means of attacking
the hate crime problem. Thus, the Mitchell decision is proba-
bly limited to the permissibility of procedural penal hate
crime legislation. The Mitchell case, however, sanctioned the
legislature's justifications to redress the special harms
caused by bias-motivated violence341 and reiterated that a
physical attack is conduct not entitled to First Amendment
protection.342
V. PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR SUBSTANTIVE PENAL HATE
CRIME LEGISLATION: TOWARD DEFINING
CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS FOLLOWING
THE R.A. V AND MITCHELL DECISIONS
Because the decisions in R.A.V. and Mitchell affect nu-
merous substantive penal hate crime laws nationwide, legis-
lators must understand the holdings of the decisions to en-
sure the constitutionality of substantive penal hate crime
laws. In addition, although not discussed by the majority in
R.A.V., legislators must note due process problems, such as
vagueness and overbreadth, found in imprecise substantive
penal hate crime legislation and should include a specific in-
tent element in current or prospective substantive penal hate
crime legislation.
What follows are proposed constitutional guidelines that
legislators must consider when scrutinizing substantive pe-
nal hate crime legislation. Generally, the law must clearly
spell out that certain bias-motivated acts are subject to pun-
ishment. Legislative officials should also bear in mind that
statutes should be worded to regulate conduct, or at least "ex-
pressive conduct," in order to meet the guidelines set forth in
United States v. O'Brien.343 Lastly, the proposed guidelines
will be applied to a hypothetical set of facts; i.e., a cross-burn-
ing during a town parade within a racially diverse commu-
nity,344 to demonstrate how a statute drafted under the
340. Id. at 2202.
341. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201 (1993).
342. Id. at 2199.
343. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See also supra notes 275-295 and accompanying
text.
344. A public demonstration on city streets would be recognized by the
courts as activity conducted within the "public forum." See GUNTHER, supra
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O'Brien factors would not unreasonably violate an individ-
ual's First Amendment rights.
A. Act Element: Does the Law Regulate Violent Conduct,
Not Pure Expression?
The first proposed element requires that there be specific
discriminatory conduct identified in the regulation.3 45 The
regulation should clearly lay out specific discriminatory acts.
The sanctioning of speech must be avoided, unless the expres-
sion could be construed as an assault or violent threat. 4 6 To
determine whether the verbal assault rises to the level of con-
duct, the court should first review the language of the stat-
ute. On reviewing the statute's language, the proposed appli-
cable test should be whether a reasonable person within the
community would have felt physically threatened by such
behavior.
If the law proscribes speech content, the regulation is
subject to strict-scrutiny judicial review. In this event, the
state should be prepared to demonstrate two elements. First,
the legislative history must indicate that there exists a com-
pelling governmental interest for controlling the hate crime
problem. This element may possibly be satisfied by introduc-
ing reports and local studies indicating a rapid rise of hate
crime activity. Second, the state must show that the regula-
tion is narrowly drafted to meet this interest. If the regula-
tion is carefully drafted to punish only certain forms of inten-
tional discriminatory conduct, this element will also be
satisfied.
Because of the usual difficulty in surviving strict-scru-
tiny review, the government should try to reduce the level of
scrutiny required by advocating that the law is content-neu-
tral and is meant to regulate "expressive conduct," and there-
fore it only incidentally burdens First Amendment freedoms.
note 1, at 1249 n.1, 1250. In general, access to places such as streets and parks
is of special importance and is thus entitled to First Amendment protection be-
yond that given to conduct performed in other arenas. Id.
345. For a discussion on why conduct lacking expressive elements is not af-
forded full First Amendment protection, see supra text accompanying notes
180-204.
346. For an explanation describing why assaults and threats are not pro-
tected by the First Amendment, see supra text accompanying notes 185-198.
347. For an outline of the elements required to meet strict-scrutiny judicial
review, see supra note 119.
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If it is successful, the statute would be subject only to lesser
O'Brien judicial scrutiny.348
If a criminal defendant challenged his charge of burning
a cross during a parade, the following analysis under the
O'Brien guidelines would apply. First, the government
should have no problems demonstrating that the regulation
of violent activity leading to violent retaliatory activity is
within its constitutional power under the Tenth Amend-
ment. 49 Second, the government may successfully argue that
its interest in protecting the entire community from physical
harm resulting from violence in retaliation for the public
cross burning is an important or substantial interest. Third,
the government could show that its interest in preventing a
massive display of retaliatory violence imminently following
a cross-burning demonstration is not related to the suppres-
sion of the individuals' expressive ideas. Fourth, the govern-
ment could argue that any alleged restriction on First
Amendment freedom in regulating such activity as a public
cross-burning is both incidental and substantially out-
weighed by the state's interest in preventing and sanctioning
hate conduct that is imminently likely to escalate into mas-
sive bloodshed, mirroring the events following the officers' ac-
quittals in the first Rodney G. King trial.35 °
B. Specific Intent Element: Does the Regulation Expressly
Include a Specific Intent Element?
To comply with due process, the second proposed element
is that the regulation contain a specific-intent modifier. This
may be achieved by including modifying terms such as "inten-
tionally," "purposefully," and "knowingly" immediately pre-
ceding the conduct element.35 1
Applied to the hypothetical, the government would have
little problem showing that the defendant's act was inten-
348. For an analysis of the O'Brien guidelines, see supra text accompanying
notes 275-295.
349. For an analysis of this prong under the O'Brien guidelines, see supra
text accompanying notes 279-282.
350. For a discussion of the civil uprising following the first Rodney G. King
beating trial, see supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
351. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988) ("willfully subjects"); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 422.6 (1988 & Supp. 1993) ("willfully injure[s] . . . any other person" and
"knowingly deface[s] . . . real or personal property").
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tional due to the public display occurring in a racially diverse
community.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hate violence is a growing problem that must be con-
trolled and reduced by passing constitutionally appropriate
legislation. Legislators need to acknowledge that an individ-
ual's expressive freedom is protected by the First Amend-
ment. In short, legislators must limit their substantive penal
hate crime regulations to punish only discriminatory violent
conduct, not purely offensive speech.
A substantive penal hate crime law that is drafted within
the parameters of the proposed guidelines would withstand
constitutional tests, because the guidelines require that the
legislation regulate intentional conduct toward a selected vic-
tim. If the law impacts speech, the regulation would be pre-
sumptively invalid, unless it can survive strict-scrutiny judi-
cial review or if the regulation falls under an R.A.V.
enumerated exception. If the law regulates conduct contain-
ing expressive elements in a content-neutral fashion, the reg-
ulation must satisfy the guidelines set forth in United States
v. O'Brien.352
The policy of providing substantive penal hate crime leg-
islation that conforms to the proposed guidelines is that the
law essentially would function dually as a criminal statute
and an anti-discrimination law. These two roles would help
ensure that individuals are not physically harmed or as-
saulted because of their race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sex-
ual orientation, or disability.
The proposed guidelines set forth in this comment re-
solve the issues many legislators face. The guidelines are
constitutionally even-handed, because they accommodate
both sides' needs and rights. The guidelines recognize the
government's need to vindicate the victims' civil rights, while
at the same time avoiding impermissible infringement on an
individual's First Amendment interests and due process
rights.
The First Amendment protects an individual's freedom
to believe whatever he or she wants, and even to express
messages in furtherance of those beliefs. However, if such
352. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See also supra text accompanying notes 275-297.
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person intentionally inflicts violent conduct on an identifiable
victim because of bigotry, the government must have the
means to substantively proscribe such behavior. In other
words, although every individual in society is free to hold be-
liefs of his or her choosing, including bigotry and bias, consti-
tutionally permissible substantive penal hate crime legisla-
tion would send a message that egregious hate violence and
victimization will not be tolerated.
In the final analysis, community members must educate,
build awareness, and gain acceptance of each other to reduce
and ultimately eliminate bigotry and intolerance. Until then,
carefully drafted substantive penal hate crime legislation is a
necessary means to protect every member of society from dis-
criminatory violence.
Lisa S.L. Ho
